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INTERNATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION REGIMES AS A FACTOR IN THE TRANSFORMATION OF NATIONAL PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICES: INSTITUTIONAL-NORMATIVE DIMENSION

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The relevance of this study is determined by the growing internationalisation of anti-corruption standards, which, once incorporated into the domestic legal order, increasingly predetermine the transformation of parliamentary practices and form a new quality of the institutional and normative existence of modern legislatures. The main objective of the article is to identify and theoretically explicate mechanisms through which international anti-corruption regimes exert a transformative influence on national parliaments, revealing them within the complex dialectic of global and local norm projections.

The methodology of this research is grounded on the combination of system-structural and institutional-functional approaches with the application of comparative-legal analysis, which allows to reconstruct the polycentric interaction between global regimes and national political practices. The use of dialectical hermeneutics and methods of critical discourse analysis ensures an in-depth interpretation of latent meanings of normative acts, resolutions and declarations in which anti-corruption imperatives of the international law are crystallised.

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The findings demonstrate that the influence of international anti-corruption regimes is not confined to the sphere of legal implementation; it is also manifested in the aspect of the symbolic redefinition of parliamentarism, where new standards of transparency, accountability and institutional legitimacy are established. It is established that the transformation of parliamentary practices takes place through a complex process of normative incorporation, accompanied by the modification of discursive parameters of the legislative activity and the reorientation of the political culture of representative bodies.

The conclusions emphasise that international anti-corruption regimes function as a kind of "meta-norms", capable of modifying domestic institutions toward enhancing the normative congruence between global requirements and national law-making practices. This transformation testifies not only to legal adaptation, but also to profound reconfiguration of the institutional architectonics of parliaments, which are compelled to function under conditions of global normative competition.

So, the study substantiates the concluding that international anti-corruption regimes, acting simultaneously as an integrative factor and an instrument of the disciplinary influence, significantly modify national parliamentary practices, fostering the grounding of a new type of normativity in which universalist anti-corruption imperatives and immanent peculiarities of local political traditions are synthesised.

Key words: international anti-corruption regimes; parliamentary practices; normativity; institutional transformation; global governance; regulatory incorporation; political culture.

Introduction

In the scientific comprehension of the phenomenon of international anti-corruption regimes, one encounters a peculiar ontological paradox: while devoid of universal jurisdiction in the classical sense, they nevertheless articulately constitute novel models of normative rationality, which, in an invariant manner, are projected onto the domestic political structures of states (Amundsen and Jackson, 2021). At the same time, the issue extends far beyond the imperatives of legal harmonisation or the mere transcription of norms; it entails a profound reconfiguration of the very mechanisms of legitimisation of parliamentarism, which, as a result of external normative intervention, is compelled to engage in a perpetual reflection upon its own procedural doctrine (Likarchuk, 2024; Likarchuk et al., 2023). The incorporation of parliamentary institutions into the orbit of trans-

national anti-corruption conventions engenders the phenomenon of normative-institutional hybridisation: traditional legal practices, grounded in autochthonous customs and regulatory codes, interlace with universalist constructs emanating from global legal centres (Duba and Lehohla, 2025). This process illustrates a dialectical collision between local autonomy and global normativity, wherein the national parliament is inevitably transformed into an arena for the probation of semi-extraterritorial ethical imperatives. It is precisely within this sphere that a complex institutional symbiosis emerges, in which the simulacrum of transparency and accountability is gradually crystallised into an effective mechanism of political disciplinisation.

The phenomenon of normative entropy is equally significant. The excessive inflation of international obligations provokes the risk of their purely formal, or at times even declarative, assimilation (Rose-Ackerman, 2024). Being situated in a state of constant receptive adaptation, a parliament forfeits its monopoly over autonomously defining legislative priorities, since these are increasingly determined by extra-national centers of law-making initiative (Bismuth, Dunin-Wasowicz and Nichols, 2021). Consequently, a peculiar bicentricity of the parliamentary field is materialised: on the one hand, the domestic logic of political representation; on the other hand, the transnational dictate of compliance, which leaves no space for institutional indifference.

So, international anti-corruption regimes ought to be interpreted as quasi-sovereign normative architectures that explicitly modify the axiological foundations of parliamentarism, transforming not only its formal-legal procedures but also the very cognitive matrix of legitimising the state authority. Their influence cannot be reduced to jurisdictional coercion. It acquires the character of a civilisational challenge, insofar as it necessitates the institutional reorientation of parliament from the model of a closed national regulator to the status of an element embedded within a global normative web. It is precisely herein that their deepest transformational potential lies. This potential must be comprehended through the prism not merely of legal, but also of political and philosophical reflection.

Analysis of recent research and publications

Recent studies demonstrate that international anti-corruption regimes significantly influence the transformation of national parliamentary practices, shaping new institutional and normative approaches to corruption control. I. Amundsen and D. Jackson (2021) emphasise the importance of adapting anti-corruption strategies in politically de-democratising regimes, where traditional parliamentary oversight mechanisms are often weak. R. Bismuth, J. Dunin-Wasowicz and P. M. Nichols (2021) highlight a tendency toward the transnationalisation of anti-corruption law, which promotes the unification of standards and procedures

at the national institutional level. E. T. Gjorgjievska (2022) analyses parliamentary legitimation strategies in the context of anti-corruption reforms. The scientist focuses on interaction between international norms and national legislation. Research by N. V. Likarchuk (2024) and O. Makarenkov (2024) demonstrates that the effectiveness of parliamentary oversight over corruption increases when a communicative approach and a model of correlation between international and national anti-corruption institutions are actively implemented.

At the same time, some scientists highlight challenges of practically implementing international standards within national parliaments. T. Duba and T. Lehohla (2025) emphasise that even with legislative reforms, the effectiveness of oversight bodies is often constrained by political factors and limited resources. L. R. Helfer, C. Rose and R. Brewster (2023) offer flexible institutional-building models in order to improve asset recovery mechanisms and accountability. S. Rose-Ackerman (2024) and L. Picci (2024) focus on global challenges in public administration and state capture, highlighting a need for a comprehensive approach that combines international norms with local practices. Moreover, K. Ketners et al. (2025), N. Likarchuk, Z. Velychko, O. Andrieieva, R. Lenda and H. Vusyk (2023) stress the role of parliaments in countering manipulative practices in social networks and the political process, which directly affects the effectiveness of anti-corruption oversight.

Formulation of the objectives of the article

The main objective of the article is the multidimensional conceptualisation and critical hermeneutics of the institutional-normative imperatives of international anti-corruption regimes as a transformative factor of national parliamentary practices, manifested through the dialectical collision between local legal tradition and global normative unification, thereby generating a complex symbiosis of legislative reception, procedural hybridisation, and axiological reconfiguration of the legitimising mechanisms of parliamentarism.

Presentations of the main material of the study

Institutionally crystallised in the form of multilateral conventions, supranational recommendations and periodic review mechanisms, international anti-corruption regimes increasingly demonstrate their paradigmatic capacity to transform national parliamentary practices, which have traditionally been characterised by a high degree of autonomy and regulatory self-containment (Beti, 2024). Their normative influence manifests itself not so much in the straightforward reception of the textual imperatives of international law, but rather in a complex process of translegal infiltration. External anti-corruption standards are gradu-

ally institutionalised within domestic parliamentary procedures, modifying established patterns of decision-making and reconfiguring the very episteme of the legislative process.

The phenomenal ambivalence of these regimes grounds on the fact that, on the one hand, they function as quasi-universalist normative constructions designed to ensure the homogenisation of legal systems in the sphere of anti-corruption policy, while, on the other hand, their implementation generates numerous fluctuations contextually determined by political traditions, the level of legal culture, and the structural inertia of national parliaments (Gjorgjievska, 2022). It is precisely within this dichotomy between the universal and the particular, the global and the local, that a complex institutional interference occurs, giving rise to new procedural innovations, notably in the sphere of parliamentary oversight, the codification of ethical standards, and the preventive regulation of conflicts of interest (Sousa and Coroado, 2024).

Thus, international anti-corruption regimes emerge not merely as external disciplinary instruments, but as normative-institutional "matrices" capable of reformatting the architectonics of parliamentary activity by conferring new parameters of transparency, accountability and legitimational resilience (Helfer, Rose and Brewster, 2023). The institutional-normative dimension of their influence not only introduces novel standards of parliamentary integrity, but also determines the emergence of qualitatively new forms of political responsibility, which, in turn, opens a space for further theoretical reflection on the transformational processes within modern parliamentarism.

International anti-corruption regimes represent a polystructural phenomenon in which normative conventions, institutional practices, transnational discourses and technological innovations interact and consolidate into a unified global mechanism for regulating anti-corruption behaviour (Ketners et al., 2025). Their teleological function grounds not only on repressing deviant practices, but also on constructing a universalist horizon of integrity that endows the anti-corruption paradigm with both legal and axiological dimensions. In this dialectical unity, global regimes emerge as a normative matrix that reconfigures the very architectonics of contemporary international law:

– It is precisely conventional regimes in the form of universal agreements that serve as the principal source of regulatory unification, since their imperative structure imposes obligations on state parties without the possibility of unilateral evasion. They not only establish juridical coordinates but also constitute a codified horizon of legitimacy in which corruption appears as an institutionally delegitimised phenomenon. Thus, conventional mechanisms ensure transnational normative integration that transcends traditional state-centric models.

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– In turn, institutionalised monitoring mechanisms function as instruments of permanent oversight, transmitting the pressure of supranational structures onto states. Their effectiveness resides in the objectification of periodic reports that operate simultaneously as political signals and as quasi-binding recommendations. Consequently, the monitoring system becomes a mechanism of semi-automatic regulation of state behaviour within the global sphere.

– Meanwhile, transnational networks are formed as complex polycentric structures that aggregate heterogeneous actors (ranging from intergovernmental organisations to informal analytical communities). Within such networks, knowledge circulates, practices are homogenised, and a new type of global public sphere is constituted. As a result, epistemic authority emerges with a force comparable to that of legal imperatives.

– Financial and economic restrictions operate as the materialisation of global anti-corruption coercion, converting moral-legal imperatives into concrete economic sanctions. This encompasses asset freezes, restrictions on access to financial flows and other mechanisms that render corruption economically irrational. In such an environment, the very logic of profit neutralises corrupt incentives.

– Equally significant are regionalised norms, which reflect the dialectical interplay of the universal and the local within the anti-corruption architectonic. Regional institutions adapt global standards by taking into account the cultural, political and juridical particularities of their respective societies. This hybridisation of norms generates a multilayered space of legal pluralism.

– Ethical legitimation emerges as a meta-positivist foundation of anti-corruption regimes, insofar as they claim the status of moral imperatives of the world order. This involves not only combating criminalised practices, but also articulating corruption as a civilisational anachronism. Consequently, the anti-corruption paradigm acquires the character of axiological universalism.

– Sovereignty transformations become an inevitable consequence of the internalisation of international norms, which requires states to delegate part of their jurisdictional prerogatives. This entails the gradual diminution of national autonomy in the sphere of law enforcement, compensated by integration into global normative domains. So, sovereignty is redefined in the spirit of cosmopolitan accountability.

– Technological determination shapes new parameters of anti-corruption regimes, which increasingly rely on digitalised procedures and transformations of governance infrastructures. The use of electronic registries, blockchain systems and algorithmic oversight produces an environment of maximal transparency. In

such a sense, technology ceases to be merely instrumental and emerges as a novel form of normativity.

– A distinct form of latent coercion is constituted by reputational sanctions, which deprive states of international prestige and relegate them to marginal positions within the global order. The loss of reputation directly correlates with the decline of economic attractiveness and political capital. This mechanism operates less overtly than legal sanctions, yet often with greater efficacy.

– A crucial element is the inclusiveness of civil society. It becomes institutionally embedded in global anti-corruption mechanisms. Non-governmental organisations, investigative journalism and expert communities act as forms of "global audits" that maintain states within the sphere of public scrutiny. So, international regimes acquire enhanced legitimacy.

– A dynamic character of norm-making ensures the vitality of anti-corruption regimes, as they are capable of adapting to the constantly changing conditions of a globalised environment. Emerging corrupt practices provoke the development of more complex procedures and the expansion of regulatory frameworks. This guarantees the enduring relevance and flexibility of international standards (Hardy, 2024; Ketners et al., 2025).

– An institutional and normative dimension of international anti-corruption regimes in modern political science discourse is conceptualised as a complex configuration in which universalist regulatory standards, as products of transnational organisations, interact with local parliamentary practices, forming a poly-structural space of normative hybridization (Makarenkov, 2024). There occurs not merely a mechanical implantation of external imperatives into national legal systems, but also a gradual erosion of entrenched political-cultural patterns that previously sustained clientelism and backroom deals. So, international anti-corruption regimes function not only as instruments of external governance but also as catalysts of institutional reflexivity, manifesting themselves in the transformation of the very ethos of parliamentary activity:

– Ratification of the UN Convention against Corruption serves as a catalyst of legal internationalization. It compels national parliaments to review traditional legislative procedures and to implement standards of transparency that had previously remained declarative. Being institutionally determined, this process transforms parliamentary practice through the establishment of new oversight bodies and the strengthening of deputies' accountability. Marked by the creation of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, the Ukrainian experience after 2006 demonstrates that the ratification of such conventions exerts far-reaching effects on legislative oversight and accountability.

– Implementation of GRECO recommendations functions as a form of cognitive and normative pressure on parliaments, compelling them to adopt codes of

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ethical conduct and disciplinary mechanisms. These recommendations reinforce procedures for preventing conflicts of interest and formalize decision-making processes. The Lithuanian case, where strict rules on the declaration of deputies' interests were introduced, attests to the direct influence of international standards on national practices.

– Adaptation of the EU acquis entails the primacy of supranational directives over local autonomy, forcing parliaments to modify national procedures under the pressure of European standards. This produces a new paradigm of legal conformism, in which former behind-the-scenes practices are displaced by formalised norms. The Polish experience, where restrictions on private party financing are introduced, demonstrates how harmonisation with the acquis shapes financial discipline in parliamentary institutions.

– Establishment of specialised parliamentary committees functions as a preventive control mechanism that limits opportunities for corrupt deviations. They ensure constant oversight of the compatibility of deputies' activities with private interests and contribute to the formalisation of ethical standards. In Georgia, such a committee made it possible to systematically monitor conflicts of interest, enhancing the effectiveness of parliamentary policy.

– Strengthening of deputies' financial reporting transforms a privatised logic of enrichment into open public accountability, compelling parliamentarians to act transparently. It creates a new symbolic capital of integrity and affects the political legitimacy of institutions. Romania, where deputies annually publish declarations of assets and income, serves as a vivid example of such external pressure and its internal transformative role.

– Regulation of lobbying activity makes it possible to separate legitimate forms of influence from corrupt practices and ensures transparency in parliamentary interaction with business. It creates normative frameworks for legitimate lobbying and reduces the risks of covert arrangements. The UK open register of lobbyists has become a benchmark for Central and Eastern European countries, demonstrating the practical effectiveness of such a mechanism.

– Unification of disciplinary sanctions harmonises ethical standards, as well as minimises tolerance for violations within parliament. It simultaneously fulfills punitive and preventive functions, enhancing the legitimacy of the legislative institution. The French experience, where fines and suspensions are applied to deputies for breaching disclosure rules, exemplifies the successful implementation of this practice.

– Independent monitoring of electoral finances creates conditions for equality in political competition and neutralises resource asymmetries between parties. It estab-

lishes transparent standards of financial oversight and reduces the risks of corrupt influence. Under the influence of the OSCE, in Slovakia, an autonomous supervisory body was established, clearly demonstrating the effectiveness of such a mechanism.

– Introduction of electronic asset declarations combines technological oversight with normative coercion, creating a new level of transparency and public monitoring. It promotes the digitalisation of integrity procedures and reduces opportunities for hidden enrichment. The Ukrainian case, where electronic declarations became a condition for cooperation with the EU and the IMF, illustrates how technological innovations can be integrated into the institutional context of parliamentary oversight (Nelson and Afonso, 2024; Picci, 2024).

Conclusions

In the final analytical perspective, it appears well-grounded to assert that functioning as distinctive transnational matrices of normative rationalisation, international anti-corruption regimes determine not only the modification of the procedural-legal attributes of parliamentary activity, but also inspire a permanent rethinking of its axiological foundations. What is at stake is a process of profound reinstitutionalisation, within which external imperatives gradually infiltrate national legislative systems, transforming their internal logic and compelling parliamentarism to move beyond the boundaries of traditional normativity. The ambivalence of such a phenomenon lies in the fact that the implementation of universalist standards of transparency and integrity does not constitute a mechanical transplantation of regulatory models but rather emerges as a complex dialectic of glocalised practices, wherein the global and the local enter into relations of mutual adaptation and hybridization. This collision conditions the gradual erosion of patrimonial and clientelist patterns, which for a long period functioned as the latent framework of the political process, and enables the transition toward a new paradigm of parliamentary legitimacy.

Equally significant is the fact that international anti-corruption regimes institutionalise a particular form of normative coercion that cannot be reduced to disciplinary control, but instead actualises the intention of self-reflection within parliamentary institutions. Through the creation of specialised committees, the unification of ethical standards, the regulation of lobbying activities and the digitalisation of declaration procedures, they generate a multilevel architectonics of integrity which simultaneously performs the functions of a preventive barrier and a symbolic resource of political legitimation.

The institutional-normative dimension of international anti-corruption regimes should be considered as a catalyst of politico-legal modernisation, one that constitutes new parameters of interaction between parliamentary ethics and normative universalism. In this sense, parliaments appear not as enclosed instru-

ments of domestic political representation but as open, poly-structural organisms integrated into the global regulatory discourse, where the interweaving of universalist standards and local practices produces a new quality of political culture and further horizons of democratic legitimacy.

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МІЖНАРОДНІ АНТИКОРУПЦІЙНІ РЕЖИМИ ЯК ФАКТОР ТРАНСФОРМАЦІЇ НАЦІОНАЛЬНИХ ПАРЛАМЕНТСЬКИХ ПРАКТИК: ІНСТИТУЦІЙНО-НОРМАТИВНИЙ ВИМІР

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Актуальність дослідження обумовлюється зростаючою інтернаціоналізацією антикорупційних стандартів, які, будучи імплементованими у внутрішньодержавний правопорядок, дедалі більшою мірою детермінують перетворення парламентських практик та формують нову якість інституційно-нормативного буття сучасних законодавчих органів. Мета статті полягає у виявленні та теоретичній експлікації механізмів, завдяки яким міжнародні антикорупційні режими здійснюють трансформаційний вплив на національні парламенти, оприявнюючи їх у складній діалектиці глобальних та локальних нормопроєкцій.

Методологічний арсенал дослідження ґрунтується на поєднанні системно-структурного та інституційно-функціонального підходів із залученням порівняльно-правового аналізу, що дозволяє реконструювати поліцентричну взаємодію глобальних режимів і національних політичних практик. Використання діалектичної герменевтики та методів критичного дискурс-аналізу забезпечує глибинну інтерпретацію латентних сенсів нормативних актів, резолюцій і декларацій, у яких кристалізуються антикорупційні імперативи міжнародного права.

Результати дослідження виявляють, що вплив міжнародних антикорупційних режимів не обмежується сферою юридичної імплементації; він реалізується також у площині символічного переозначення парламентаризму, де формуються нові стандарти прозорості, підзвітності та інституційної легітимності. Встановлено, що трансформація парламентських практик відбувається через складний процес нормативної інкорпорації, який супрово-

джується зміною дискурсивних параметрів законодавчої діяльності та переорієнтацією політичної культури представницьких органів.

Висновки підкреслюють, що міжнародні антикорупційні режими функціонують як своєрідні «метанорми», здатні модифікувати внутрішньодержавні інститути у напрямі підвищення нормативної конгруентності між глобальними вимогами та національними правотворчими практиками. Ця трансформація засвідчує не лише правову адаптацію, а й глибинне переформатування інституційної архітектоніки парламентів, котрі змушені функціонувати в умовах глобальної нормативної конкуренції.

Таким чином, дослідження дає підстави для висновку, що міжнародні антикорупційні режими, виступаючи інтеграційним чинником і водночас інструментом дисциплінарного впливу, істотно модифікують національні парламентські практики, сприяючи формуванню нового типу нормативності, де синтезуються універсалістські антикорупційні імперативи та іманентні особливості локальних політичних традицій.

Ключові слова: міжнародні антикорупційні режими; парламентські практики; нормативність; інституційна трансформація; глобальне управління; правова інкорпорація; політична культура.