THE ENTENTE CORDIALE OF THE ANTITHETIC POWERS: CHINA’S AND RUSSIA’S STRUGGLE WITH THE UNIPOLAR ORDER

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Current issues between the “West”/Western-allies and Russia and China are of systemic nature, not in terms of structure but order, therefore not in the sense of a community modelled on microeconomic actors’ power-relations but in the sense of an intersubjective, normative reference that engenders meaningful, living, individual actor-system relations that encompass power-relations. They constitute the contents of a fundamental dialectic between two Weltanschauungen, the one that defined the post-bipolar/unipolar international order and the one these two major powers had long preserved through their individual modus vivendi with it. Their modus vivendi largely faded away for reasons specific to each of them. The “antithetic” nature of their challenge has been aligning the two powers flexibly yet durably, while the self-standingly “thetic” nature of the unipolar order has so far slowed its reaction. The antithetic entente has proven durable also during the last episode of confrontation between Russia and the international order, the invasion of Ukraine.

The very presence of the unipolar order makes the entente of the antithetic powers valid and a systemic magnet to other regimes of similar or tending-to-be of similar nature, offering them a possibility of security alignment. However, there is no cultural or historical affinity between China and Russia to produce a natural alignment. Their common security concerns as regards separatist and fundamentalist
movements are more of a matter of ad hoc coordination as it was during the 90s, rather than a basis for alignment. Trade, finance and investments are certainly of common interest, yet they alone do not constitute a reason for alignment but a consequence of it, as shown by their need to be politically balanced. Military cooperation, in particular the Russian arms supply and technology transfers to China bear importance, yet this importance stems from the increasingly confrontational relations with the unipolar order, therefore it constitutes, here again, a consequence rather than a cause of alignment.

**Keywords:** Russia; China; unipolarity; democracy; authoritarianism.

### Introduction

Among other issues, the Brussels NATO Summit Communiqué (Brussels Summit Communiqué, 2022) of June 2021 had four interlinked emphases that outlined the Alliance’s policy framework: Anti-authoritarian stance, Russian challenge, China’s rising power/assertiveness and consolidation of the Alliance. The Communiqué continued with the stress on the collective defence against a defined symmetrical threat, which was resurrected at the 2014 Wales Summit. Russia is depicted as such. As to China, the Communiqué underlined its assertiveness, opaqueness, authoritarianism and cooperation with Russia. NATO expressed its desire to cooperate with the (Western-inclined) countries of Asia while maintaining dialogue with Beijing (Heisbourg, 2020). The Communiqué diagnosed a systemic challenge from Moscow and Beijing.

The US Government’s recently increased efforts toward rallying and mobilising democracies throughout the world have further emphasised the normative facet of this change of attitude since 2014. These efforts, by excluding Russia and China, tacitly yet notably underlined the current existence of a dialectic with these powers which is more profound than specific political, economic or security questions, a systemic contradiction between two Weltanschauungen which ontologically precedes them. This found a “validating echo” from Moscow and Beijing, which vehemently voiced the non-universality of “western” democratic values and the threat the western policies for spreading them constitutes for the international stability. Their reaction has also been of normative nature, confirming the existence of two confronting Weltanschauungen (In joint op-ed, China and Russia decry US democracy summit, 2021; China and Russia decry Biden’s plans for democracy summit, 2021).

### Analysis of the previous publications and researches

The ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine has marked the peak of this system-challenge so far: Russia’s declared “grievances” for the invasion were formulated, as amplification of the post-2014 period discourse, were directly related to the “order”
and Kyiv's relations with it (Transcript: Vladimir Putin's Televised Address on Ukraine, 2022). As such, Russian war discourse consisted of a bigger, systemic struggle against a wider anti-Russian front, the order itself, which was encouraging Kyiv in its "policies that engendered casus belli". Beijing has been flexibly supporting Russia in a position of neutrality which effectively seeks to neutralise the difference of nature between the aggressor and the aggressed in this conflict (Tian, 2022; Ku, 2022; Blanchette and Lin, 2022; Mallard, 2022). Moreover, even during the aggression committed by Russia, China’s criticism concentrated on NATO and the US (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China, 2022; Cheung, 2022; Yang (Taipei), 2022; Doherty, 2022), sharing the “systemic logic” of Moscow, contrasting to the latter in intensity rather than in nature.

**Specifying the purpose of research**

The current challenge is a relatively new phenomenon for the post-bipolar era. Despite the fact that neither Russia nor China lost their capability to threaten even at the “unipolar moment” and despite the fact that these countries have never passed as full democracies, they were not depicted as system-challengers during most of this time. The inverse is also true: Neither Russia’s nor China’s criticism of “Western/unipolar norms” claim to universality” is new discourse yet they used to avoid escalation. Why and how the challenge was delayed? What is the nature of the previous non-confrontation and of the actual confrontation?

To answer these questions, this paper shall make use of the structural realist terminology as it fits to the notions of “international system” and “systemic challenge”, yet not without questioning its assumptions which impede the study of these very questions. This work shall be centred on the normative field at systemic/structural level, as Weltanschauungen which build an international order as the meaning-ground of actors’ interaction, including power relations. In this vein, the first sub-section shall be reserved to briefly outlining a theoretical framework for the unipolar order, to be followed by the description of the non-confrontational “modus vivendi” period between the order and today’s two major “anti-unipolar” powers. The second section’s first part will deal with the dynamics of the modus vivendi's erosion and the two major powers’ shift toward systemic challenge. The last two sub-sections will attempt to define the resulting Sino-Russian entente cordiale, its meaning for the international system and the unipolar order’s emerging reaction.
Results of the research

I. The Unipolar Order and its Coexistence with Major Antithetic Powers

Structure and order: The question of unipolarity

Structural realism fits in an inquiry about the system, systemic challenge and consequent alignments of systemic nature as it studies the structure of the international politics and the general behaviour patterns of actors in reference to it. The structure is expressed in terms of polarity and frameworks the actors’ positions. The actors’ behaviour patterns are modelled on microeconomy’s (Waltz, 1979) assumptions, consequently presenting uniformities in reference to the structure. To summarise its main proposals:

– The States “are unitary actors with a single motive-the wish to survive” (Waltz, 1996, 1979);
– International system’s structure emerges from the interaction patterns of these unitary actors with that existential motive, (as such) States are the main actors of the international system (Mansfield, 1993; Waltz, 1979);
– International system is anarchic (Waltz, 1979; Mansfield, 1993);
– The main parameter of interaction is power in large sense;
– The structure that emerges from there is consequently determined by the power distribution among the interacting States (Waltz, 1979, pp. 97–99);
– A great power is “a State with a qualitative edge relative to the other states based on the aggregate score on the size of territory, population, economy, military, resource endowment, political stability and political competence”(Waltz, 1979, 1993, pp. 44–79), which are components of power.
– The “qualitative edge” becomes determinant in defining the structure of the international system which constitutes the objective reference for the States in their own positioning and interactions.
– The structure becomes definable in terms of polarity as it expresses the reference to “qualitative edge” and the general patterns of the States’ positioning relative to it.
– The structure may therefore be named after the number of the “poles”, as it engenders different sorts of references and behaviour patterns within the system, both among the poles and the other units. Until today, three general types of structure have emerged: Multipolarity, bipolarity and unipolarity.
– The dynamic of the structural change is the units’ gain and loss of the great power/ pole status.
– “The theory (of international politics) explains why States similarly placed behave similarly despite their internal differences” (Waltz, 1996),
– Therefore it is about the system itself and not about the individual foreign policies, the theory of which would rather “explain why states similarly placed
in a system behave in different ways. Differences in behaviour arise from differences of internal composition” (Waltz, 1979, p. 122).

Structural realism thus formulates objectivity in a field of pure intersubjective meaning-attribution for otherwise objectively non-existent entities – States as subjects/actors – and their interaction. The ground of objectivity is maintained by separating foreign policies’ “incompatible” individualities from the structural dynamics, which are exported to the field of “internal composition of the states”. This dualism purifies the praxis of international politics for the theory, yet reduces it to artificiality at the same time, as it designs the praxis for a theoretical construct and not vice-versa (Gardner, 2019, pp. 39–60). Yet an approach based on inclusivity, since it may not be “total”, would bring another kind of selectiveness among possible parameters/causal links and diminish the cosmos-producing ground of theorisation at the same time. How to find an optimal kind of reduction and inclusivity in the study of international politics then? Is it possible to reform a comprehensive theory of international politics, here the structural realism, to enable it to study the system of states-as-actors in its inherent non-objectivity? Such an effort would require integrating the sphere of individual foreign policies to the theory, yet not plunging into the vague field of “internal compositions”.

It may be possible to concentrate the effort strictly on what emerges from that field as directly observable relation between the actor and the intersubjective reference to the system. Here the “system” needs to be defined differently from an objectivised structure. Differentiation between the international structure and the international order, which Hansen stresses (Hansen, 2011, pp. 7–8), may constitute a starting point. The structure is “objective” and inherently neutral, the order is intersubjective and non-neutral. It is the “normative appearance” of the structure, a “normative position” to be referred to, which engenders a meaningful, living, individual kind of actor-system relation. The causal background of this relation, in the sense of the “internal composition” of the actor, may not have priority or even direct relevancy in the study: It is not identical with the said relation. The relation itself, “given”, expressed in the actor’s foreign policy, constitutes the component of a systemic study of the international politics which seeks to preserve its link with praxis while remaining comprehensive and explicative. Structural realism may thus become monist through the study of order and of actor-order relation within the given structure.

To what extent may the post-bipolar international structure, both in the immediate aftermath of the USSR’s demise and today, be defined as “unipolar”? Predictably, structural realist answer to the unipolarity debate mainly resides on the
power-distribution among the system’s units. On that basis, a consensus appeared on
the occurrence of unipolarity (Jervis, 2009; Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth,
2011, pp. 1–32), yet Waltz’s earlier remark on the issue is also of note (Waltz, 1993).
The debate proceeded rather on the durability of the unipolar structure. Here the
distinction between hegemony (hierarchic) and unipolarity (still anarchic) was also
underlined (Waltz, 1979; Monteiro, 2014). The question has been studied as regards
the current state and future projections of US’ capabilities compared to other major-
powers and the answers varied between its solidity (Monteiro, 2014; Brooks and
Wohlforth, 2011, pp. 201–219; Beckley, 2018) and its forthcoming or even already-
occurred demise (Robert, 2009, pp. 21–34; Mearsheimer, 2018; Layne, 2012;
Dee, 2015). Possible forms of post-unipolar structure were thought upon (Brooks and
Wohlforth, 2016, pp. 73–87). And yet, the question of unipolar order as actual
intersubjective and “normative” appearance of the international system was largely
omitted to the benefit of power-distribution analysis (Finnemore, 2011, pp. 67–98)
and power-transition theory’s dialectic of declining “hegemon” and rising power.

Waltz’s early remark on bipolarity’s continuation “in an altered state” reflects
the over-reductionist approach limited to “power”. While being correct within its
theoretical framework, it detaches itself from the praxis as it omitted the radical
change of the intersubjective reference to the international order. Unipolarity appears
like Wohlforth’s formula of 2−1=1 (Wohlforth, 1999, pp. 5–41), yet as intersubjective
reference. If the change in power-distribution made such a reference possible, the
reference itself gained substance through the “normative canon” of unipolarity, since
it meaningfully individuated the unipole and its alliance network beyond the assets’
count. This was largely observable in early post-bipolar Russian foreign policy.
This “substance”, consisting of internationally defined/substantiated notions like
democracy, human rights, fundamental freedoms and market economy, provided the
actor-order relation with content and therefore the actor with position within the
international system.

The causal background of this relation may have indefinite number of
parameters. Yet its appearance itself, as parameter of the systemic study, may be
reduced to continuity, adherence, confrontation and coexistence. By continuity, we
mean the preceding order’s (bipolarity) alignments being compatibly extended into
unipolarity. The actors concerned were already compatible, however at different
degrees, with the “normative canon” of the side which prevailed. Discordances
appeared at policy level such as security priorities, burden-sharing or desire for a less
asymmetrical relationship with the unipole-ally, not at existential level such as
questioning the normative canon itself. In this vein, NATO’s rather problematic
reform process or EC’s/EU’s early post-bipolar political development toward
“independence” constitute relevant examples.
Adherence showed itself in the “democratic boom” throughout the world (Hansen, 2011, p. 2; Schweller, 2000; Samuel, 1991, pp. 12–34), with many actors conducting reforms that aimed at becoming compatible with the normative canon of unipolarity. In parallel, international or even “supranational” emphasis, codification and implementation of the elements of the normative canon gained impetus. Not only the ex-Warsaw Pact or ex-USSR countries but also those of the Third World underwent serious reforms to this direction (Rakner, et al., 2007).

On the other hand, direct confrontation with the unipolar order emerged among a number of actors that presented but asymmetry in their relation with the unipole, unlike the bipolar conditions when this could be balanced by the other pole. They either suffered military intervention as in the cases of Yugoslavia/ Serbia, Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya or sanctions and isolation as in the examples of Iran and North Korea.

Coexistence with the unipolar order proved to be viable for two sorts of actors. Those which were already in alignment with the “West” during bipolarity despite their non-conformities with the normative canon, as in the example of the Arab monarchies, constitute the first sort. Besides their economic integration to the “West” for many of them, the coexistence was also assured by their continuing western-anchored political positions in their region, face to potential or actual opposition to the unipolar order.

Russia’s and China’s relations with the unipolar order constituted the second sort of coexistence. Undisputedly –in structural realist sense- major powers of the post-bipolar/unipolar structure and also undisputedly not “minor” US allies of the bipolar era, their relations with the unipolar order were neither entirely asymmetrical nor western-compatible to the point of “adherence”. On the other hand, these relations were not symmetrical enough to allow them confront the unipolar order. As such, they sought coexistence with the unipolar order through formulating their modus vivendi.

Russian and Chinese modus vivendi with the unipolar order

The passage from bipolarity to unipolarity left remnants of the Soviet-Russian bipolar position in place, such as being one of the two global nuclear powers, referential counterpart to the “West” in conventional military (as reflected by the CFE Treaty) or permanent member of the UN Security Council. As such, Moscow’s referential/subjective transformation from bipolarity to unipolarity has been but partial in contrast to other ex-USSR or ex-Warsaw Pact countries, reflecting Waltz’s remark but within the broader field of actor-system relation. Again in contrast to the said countries, this seems to have played a substantial role in preventing “adherence”
to the benefit of a *modus vivendi* that would be compatible both with this unique position and the unipolar order. For the first one, Moscow sought establishment/recognition of its preponderance (or at least a *de facto* veto-power) in its *near-abroad* (Martha, 1995, pp. 353–367) and of its counterpart status in “matters of international importance” within the unipolar order. This also required meaningful preservation of the bipolarity-inherited universal mechanisms’, in particular the UN Security Council’s central role where it held the power of *liberum veto*. These *ipso facto* meant *balancing* the normative canon as well, which became for the Muscovite post-bipolar position the expression of hegemony (Lukin, 2018, pp. 3–8, 18–19, 27–29, 192; Michalski and Nilsson, 2018, pp. 1–18). It initiated the CIS and economic integration and common security mechanisms that evolved toward the EAEU and the CSTO (Kobrinskaya, 2007, pp. 13–21; Vinokurov, 2007, pp. 22–46; Willerton and Beznosov, 2007, pp. 47–68; Melville and Shakleina, eds., 2005), helped secessionism in the *pro-Western* ex-USSR countries (Rywkin, 2015, pp. 229–237; Laenen, 2012, pp. 17–38). It advocated the establishment of an “inclusive” security architecture that would replace or balance NATO (Martin, 2003, pp. 55–73; 2006, pp. 51–57). It firmly criticised NATO’s enlargement -and to a lesser degree, EU’s expansion. These elements that constituted Russia’s envisaged *modus vivendi* were summarised and continuously reiterated in the fundamental policy papers of the Federation, from the 1993 Foreign Policy Concept (Melville and Shakleina eds., 2005) onwards.

The second facet of the Russian *modus vivendi* with the unipolar order appeared as the partial transformation of Russia itself, including democratisation, market reforms and more flexible dialogue with the “Westerners”. Economic relations with the West reached significant levels and provided Moscow with almost constant trade surpluses and *relatively* weak yet substantial neat FDI inflow (Hare, et al., 1998, pp. 95–119; Westin, 1999, pp. 36–43). Besides domestic reforms, Russia made important foreign policy moves in building its *modus vivendi* with the unipolar order: Among the main examples are Russia’s participation in the PfP in 1994, the conclusion of the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997 (Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation signed in Paris, France, 1997; Melville and Shakleina, eds., 2005, pp. 75–84) which became the NATO-Russia Council in 2002, adhesion processes to the WTO (Russia becomes WTO member after 18 years of talks, 2011), the “G-8” and the Council of Europe/ the ECHR system.

Still, balancing the two elements of the *modus vivendi* did not depend solely on Russian understanding of equity or Russian expectations from the “West” and due to dynamics both endogenous and exogenous, Russian policies of coexistence with the unipolar order oscillated: The contrast between Kozyrev’s liberal/pro-western
agenda that sought to build the *modus vivendi* more through Russian adaptation to unipolar order and Primakov’s conservative, *realpolitik* stance which rather concentrated on adapting the unipolar order to Russian expectations frameworks this phenomenon during the early post-bipolar period of 90s (Tsygankov, 2016, pp. 59–96). The Russian *modus vivendi*’s paradox seems to have been the inherent incompatibility between its expectations from the unipolar order and feeble incentives or deterrence it offered back. Consequently, not only the unipolar order appeared utterly “unilateral” from Moscow’s perspective, but also and continuingly against Russian positions. Yet the *modus vivendi* held quite long: Arguably until Putin’s Munich Speech of 2007, Georgian Crisis of 2008 or even the Ukrainian Crisis of 2014 no rupture occurred between Russia and the unipolar order. In other words, self-erosion seemingly constituted the natural course, the existential dynamic of the Russian *modus vivendi* with the unipolar order.

In the case of China, the *modus vivendi* was rather built on the foundations laid during the late bipolar-era. Beijing was already estranged from the USSR and had become relatively open to reconciliation with the US in 1971–1972 (Mahmud, 2005), marked by Kissinger’s and Nixon’s visits and PRC’s taking over the UN Security Council permanent seat. The Deng-period reforms from 1978 onwards began to open China to the global economy (Dillon, ed., 2015, pp. 229–256; Vogel, 2011, pp. 464–476) and provided its own model of *modus vivendi* with ground, when the bipolarity ended. China offered the unipolar-era globalisation a huge low-cost production base, consequently attracted FDI and rapidly created a symbiosis with the unipolar order. In doing so, it could shield itself against the unipolar order’s normative canon: Beijing’s *regime* seems to have stabilised and secured its economic transformation and integration processes, both for itself and its main trade and investment “partners”, which were none other than the main actors of the order. 1989’s explosive demonstrations of the Tiananmen Square for democracy (Vogel, 2011, pp. 595–636, 640–659, 662), unhesitantly suppressed by Beijing, never happened again. Beijing never suffered *effective* normative pressure from the unipolar order as its incompatibility with one part of it effectively supported its fruitful compatibility with the other part.

GDP’s growth was impressive during the last decade of the millennium and explosive afterwards (GDP (current US$) – China, 2022). *Modus vivendi* integrated China to the international system thoroughly, yet in areas defined by Beijing and *de facto* approved by the order. For example in 2009, the country’s foreign trade volume was 64% of its also rapidly increasing GDP. The increase of Chinese share in the world trade – itself rapidly expanding – was spectacular: China made 10,36% of global exports and 9,06% of global imports in 2014, whereas – and then having been for long into the opening process – it had represented 3,9% and 3,4% of them respectively in 2000 (Hu, 2015, pp. 211–242).

As to China’s foreign policy, the *modus vivendi* included the unipolar adaptation of Deng’s non-commitment principle: Sitting on the fence between the two poles seemingly became sitting on the fence as regards the unipolar acts that were creating the paradox of the Russian *modus vivendi*. During most of the post-bipolar period, China did not *tangibly* oppose the unipolar order, including the unipolar interventions, other than strictly protecting itself from parts of its normative canon and in doing so, serving the *modus vivendi*. China’s non-unipolar, “polycentrist” discourse akin to bipolarity-inherited norms appears in that context as indicator of non-commitment/non-adherence rather than effective opposition, since it lacked matching political action. Still, if China did not demand compliance from the unipolar order, it did not change its theses and positions in its main national cases either, like the unification with Hong Kong and with Taiwan, the prevention of internationalisation of questions related to its politically “problematic” regions or stepping back from its privileged – yet not confrontational- position in the North Korea issue (Dimbleby, 2018; Ross, 2002, pp. 48–85; Chen, 2017; Heath, 2005; Chaudhuri, 2018). Chinese foreign policy’s limited expectations from the unipolar order made the *modus vivendi* far more balanced than the Russian case.

The sustainability of the *modus vivendi* within the unipolar order-dominated multilateral *fora* apparently required some effort to “bend” the normative canon, if only to prevent an “antibody effect” against the Chinese *regime*. Here, China’s normative “reframing” and “selectiveness”, as exemplified in Jones’ and Kent’s works respectively, find a “structural realist” meaning in our terms (Jones, 2018; Kent, 2009) : China tended to emphasise concepts like sovereignty, non-interference and international legitimacy in their sense inherited from bipolarity, *within* the same contexts of the unipolar normative cannon (Kent, 2009, p. 42). These emphases were improved through their amalgamation with notions that are fitting to the normative canon, such as diversity and inclusiveness. “Reframing” (Jones, 2018, pp. 256–257) thus opened room for more efficient Chinese presence in the international mechanisms, balancing the unipolar normative canon and preserving the *modus vivendi*. Moreover, “reframing” seems to have been reinforced by “selectiveness” in
order to be able to promote integration in the areas chosen by Beijing and avoiding others which would “negatively internationalise” Chinese practises that are contradictory to normative canon but fitting to modus vivendi (Kent, 2009).

II. From Modus Vivendi to Confrontation with the Unipolar Order

Modus vivendi’s fading away

Regardless their fundamental differences (one being self-erosive and the other symbiotic), both Russian and Chinese modus vivendi with the unipolar order became less and less sustainable for reasons inherent to each model.

Self-erosion inherent to Russian modus vivendi appears within two processes: Unipolar order’s enlargement toward the near-abroad which could not be balanced or mitigated also due to the relative failure of the Russian near-abroad integration mechanisms (Torjesen, 2009) and circumvention of the bipolarity-inherited “universal” mechanisms in “matters of international importance”. The main sequence of events of the Russian modus vivendi’s erosion may be shown as follows:

– Russia’s opposition to establishing a direct link between the PfP and NATO enlargement was frustrated as the PfP functioned for its ex-Warsaw Pact and even ex-USSR European members as a preparation room for NATO membership, both in terms of interoperability and adherence to normative canon (Cottey, 2018, pp. 61–65). The “non-adherent” Russia, on the other hand, was held at arm’s length within the PfP (Simon, 2008, pp. 93, 102–103).

– NATO expanded toward three ex-Warsaw Pact countries in 1999 and further expansion appeared on the horizon.

– NATO and EU enlargement or cooperation processes required partner countries to adhere to normative canon (Schimmelfennig, 2003; Acharya, 2004, pp. 239–275).

– NATO intervened in Kosovo in 1999 on the basis of its normative canon and in circumvention of the UN Security Council. The intervention was undeterred by Russia’s strong political opposition and limited military appearance (Norris, 2005; Smith, 2006, pp. 77–88), proving the merely-consultative nature of the NATO-Russia Founding Act (Smith, 2006, pp. 66–75), in contrast to Russian expectations.

– US-led coalition intervened in Iraq in 2003, occupied the country and began to reshape its regime according to the normative canon, despite Russian political opposition (Golan, 2004, pp. 429–459).

– NATO expansion continued in 2004, this time incorporating the three ex-Soviet Baltic States, also accompanied by EU as it set them firmly on the EU membership course (Kasekamp, 2020, pp. 869–896).
These events happened more or less in parallel to the pro-Western/pro-normative canon and anti-Russian colour revolutions, particularly in Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, undeterred by Russian opposition (Lincoln, 2012, pp. 44–72, 168–186; Gerlach, 2014, pp. 39–44).

GUAM was founded in 2006, regrouping pro-NATO and pro-EU CIS countries and adopting a pro-normative canon discourse, visibly against Russian influence (Charter of Organization for democracy and economic development – GUAM, 2022; Simon, 2008, pp. 102–103), further undermining Russian efforts to block the unipolar order’s expansion toward the ex-USSR geography (Eyvazov, 2008, pp. 277–288).

The sequence ipso facto negated the Russian discourse of a European security architecture that would counterbalance the “NATO-centrism” (Hurlburt, 1995, pp. 5–20; Layton, 2014, pp. 25–45).

Contradictions between the Russian logic of modus vivendi and its actual course seem to have conducted Moscow toward a more assertive and confrontational policy mindset. Russia became increasingly critical toward the normative canon as “democratism”, which it more and more vocally rejected as the discursive tool of unipolar interventionism. In this vein, Putin-era’s “sovereign democracy” notion indicates as much the discursive/ideological reaction to the normative canon as Russia’s own passage to authoritarianism (Casula, 2013, pp. 3–15; Makarychev, 2008, pp. 49–62). Putin-era Russia increasingly promoted the concepts of multipolarism/polycentrism as a solid antithesis to the unipolar order (Melville and Shakleina, eds., 2005; Chebankova, 2017, pp. 217–234; Lewis, 2018), therefore in detachment from the modus vivendi in contrast to the critical yet less confrontational version of the same discourse of the pre-Putin period, which had not sharply excluded the normative canon. In a way, Putin’s 2007 Munich Security Conference speech announced the modus vivendi’s collapse: The speech was centred on NATO enlargement yet made in no uncertain terms an open, generalised and deterrent warning to the unipolar order (Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy, 2007). This address seems to have influenced the NATO Bucharest Summit of 2008 as Ukraine and Georgia were not granted MAPs despite US efforts, largely due to German and French opposition (Arbuthnot, 2008, pp. 40–44). In the same year, when Georgia intervened in the separatist, Russian-backed South Ossetia, Moscow did not repeat its former inertia fitting to modus vivendi: Russian army heavily defeated Georgian forces, not only bringing succour to the separatists but also crippling Georgian power in Georgia-proper (Asmus, 2010; Desseyn and Tchantouridze, 2012, pp. 111–119). Moscow simultaneously recognised South Ossetian and Abkhazian independencies.

Georgian crisis’ meaning for Russia-unipolar order relation was not only Moscow’s policy change but also the West’s reluctance to escalate – except “strong
discourse” – and avoidance to guarantee Georgia against aggression. Moreover, the US government chose to initiate the "Reset" (Hahn, 2013, pp. 214–223; Lazarević, 2009, pp. 29–66) with Russia. The Bucharest Summit, Georgian Crisis and the Reset apparently validated Russian foreign policy’s turn from the *modus vivendi* for obtaining its expectations from the same *modus vivendi*: NATO enlargement toward ex-Soviet republics was paralysed, Russian preponderance in – or even the valid existence of – its “near-abroad” was *de facto* recognised. Furthermore, while the Reset facilitated the new START and Russian cooperation in Afghanistan operation (Deyermond, 2013, pp.500–523), its form and timing seemingly fulfilled Russia’s other expectation from the *modus vivendi*, the recognition of its “equal say” in “matters of international importance”, through the very destruction of the same *modus vivendi*.

Still, if the Western reluctance to escalate was proven on these occasions, the subsequent fading away of the Reset also proved, to a measure, the two sides' fundamentally different understanding of its *structural* meaning: If the Reset meant for the Russian side a positive transformation which provided what the *modus vivendi* had aimed at and failed (Hahn, 2013), for the unipole it apparently constituted a reconciliatory effort to *restore* the *modus vivendi*. This contrast surfaced during the Arab Spring: The 2010 movements against the region’s authoritarian regimes received the unipolar order’s open support in exclusion of Russia (Perra, 2016, pp. 1–24; Dannreuther, 2015, pp. 77–94). In 2011, the NATO intervention in Libya and the unipolar order’s support to Syrian opposition in the civil war further aggravated the rift (O’Sullivan, 2018; Dannreuther, 2015). Consequently, when crisis erupted in Ukraine over the issue of the mutually exclusive EU Association Agreement and EAEU Treaty (Libman and Obydenkova, 2018, pp. 1037–1058) and the Russophile Yanukovich government was overthrown, Russia resumed its “Georgian policy”: There, like the Orange Revolution, the opposition’s discourse was founded on the normative canon and pro-Western stance. Unlike the Orange Revolution, pro-Russian regions of Donetsk, Lugansk and Crimea seceded, Russia directly intervened, defeated Ukraine, annexed Crimea and secured the separatist entities in the other two regions (Menon and Rumer, 2015; Hahn, 2018). This time the “unipolar order” sanctioned Russia and Russia reciprocated. Ukraine received Western political support but was neither granted MAP, nor security guarantees against Russia, nor an EU membership perspective. Russia could neither be deterred from its Ukrainian *fait accompli*, nor a credible reaction of systemic nature in the form of the effective isolation of the aggressor or protection of the aggrieved could be organised. Even the sanctions proved to be largely ineffective (Kholodilin and
Netšunajev, 2019, pp. 39–51; Shchetinskaia, 2016, pp. 1–20). However not without a political and economic price, Russia's *modus vivendi* aims could be once again pursued by turning away from *modus vivendi* policies. It is therefore not surprising to see Russia directly intervening and staying in Syria the following year, “victoriously” securing the Damascene regime (Pieper, 2019). The Syrian intervention thus constituted another example to the validity of acting against the *modus vivendi* to reach the *modus vivendi*'s aims, in sharp contrast to Kosovo, Iraq and Libya episodes.

Therefore not only its inherent erosion but also the efficiency of the confrontation alternative brought the end of the *modus vivendi*. This was expressed in the fundamental policy papers of 2014–2016, not only with “complaint” but also with a belligerent if not a triumphant tone, stressing the “emergence of a multipolar system”, the erosion of global economic and political dominance of the “traditional western powers”, the existence of a “serious crisis in the relations between Russia and the Western States” and US’ and its allies’ “containment policy” against Russia (The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 2015; The Foreign Policy concept of the Russian Federation. Approved by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016).

The invasion of Ukraine constitutes the – current – result of the *modus vivendi*’s being replaced by the systemic challenge for reaching the aims of the *modus vivendi* from the Muscovite position. The establishment of a pro-Russian regime in Kyiv with a military *fait accompli*, accompanied by the order’s reluctance to react efficiently, could complete the Russian “securisation” of its near-abroad against the order’s institutional (NATO and the EU) and *normative* expansion. The invasion has been made possible by the very reluctance of the custodians of the order in guaranteeing Ukraine, both in opening Kyiv’s way to the NATO membership and in deterring Russia by being clear as to their involvement (Wagner and Parker, 2021; Wolf, 2022). Due to the course of its relations with the order until then, Moscow apparently saw acceptable risks only as it initiated the invasion, both in military and in political/economic terms, the first related to Ukraine’s capability and determination to resist and the second, the custodians’ willingness to react efficiently. However, the invasion failed as to its initial aims and the custodians reacted by introducing crippling sanctions (What are the sanctions on Russia and are they hurting its economy?, 2022; Bown, 2022) and by rapidly sending substantial material help to Kyiv to resist Russian armed forces successfully (Gedeon, 2022; Mills and Curtis, 2022; Ukraine: EU doubles military aid to €1 billion – as it happened, 2022). At first glance, Russia has found itself in a total and disadvantageous confrontation with the international order which it provoked through a war it has been failing to win. Still, Ukraine’s expressed inclination to provide Russia with its secondary aims –
neutrality of Ukraine and plebiscites in secessionist territories – in exchange for peace and guarantees with still unclear substance (Ukraine has offered neutrality in talks with Russia – what would that mean?, 2022; Ukraine war: Zelenskyy says Ukraine is willing to consider declaring neutrality and offer security guarantees to Russia, 2022; Seddon, et al., 2022; Saul, 2022), is susceptible to make the current war another episode of the Russia-international order relation’s confrontational course rather than the event to decide its result.

Chinese *modus vivendi*’s erosion apparently stems from the deterioration of the elements that formed the positive, symbiotic cycle of Beijing’s relation with the unipolar order. One of the *modus vivendi*’s main pillars, the manpower supply, became costlier not only due to benefits of economic growth but also because of the demographic change (Wang and Mason, 2008, pp. 136–166). China began to face an overcapacity problem as the much invested-upon labour-intensive sectors increasingly needed new markets or profitable relocation to countries with cheaper labour, which gradually began to make China build its own “alternative” network in competition with the “developed countries” which are almost invariably adherents of the unipolar order (Johnston, 2018, pp. 1–19). Also, Chinese production profile extended beyond its initial *modus vivendi* “niche”: China’s competitive higher-technology goods began to occupy an ever increasing place in the Chinese trade, therefore within the niche of its *modus vivendi* counterparts. Beijing’s economic and political *dirigisme*, protected by the very *modus vivendi*, began to work against it as the production and trade niche began to change: The *regime* continued to provide State-involved companies with unusual advantages in competition through State-owned or involved banks’/institutions’ privileged finance and guarantees, creating unequal competition in common niches with the *modus vivendi* counterparts, including the services/ construction sector in third countries along with the production of higher technology goods. Intellectual property violations further fuelled the unequal competition (Thomas, 2017) and the unipole’s and its allies’ irritation caused by big and chronic deficits in their bilateral trade with China increased, despite Beijing’s re-financing policy through investment in their financial instruments. On the other hand, the same “advantages” granted to Chinese firms apparently in contradiction to market-rationality seems to have engendered the gradual deterioration of their indebtedness status and financial institutions’ credit returns (Lo, 2007, pp. 39–66), which consequently required even more *dirigisme* with now-negative effects on the Chinese *modus vivendi*.

These certainly do not imply the abrupt end to China’s *modus vivendi*. The symbiosis built between China and the unipolar order is apparently “too big

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to fail”. However, its very success to transform China did not only cause its erosion but also created the need for more China-centred, post-modus vivendi economic and political networks. Participants to such a structure were likely to be found among the normatively and economically less-integrated actors, mostly underdeveloped countries with a tendency to authoritarianism. This in turn required political and economic incentives and assurances: Chinese foreign policy thus evolved toward the promotion of common welfare through trade with and investments to the peripherals, with more emphasis on its already existing alternative normative discourse based on multipolarism/ polycentrism, inclusivity, sovereignty and non-interference, which are particularly appealing to their regimes.

We had depicted Jones’s notion of “reframing” as a policy for sustaining the Chinese modus vivendi within the international structures where the unipolar order was present or dominant. In parallel to the erosion of the modus vivendi, China also attempted to found new structures that are purified of unipolar order’s normative references. Jones’ FOCAC example, the AIIB and the evolution of the SCO may be counted among these attempts (Jones, 2018, pp.256–257). Yet the BRI has been the ultimate enterprise to answer Beijing’s post-modus vivendi needs: Declared in 2013 and initiated in 2014, it aimed at developing connectivity and boosting trade, investments and infrastructure on an unprecedented scale, covering 65 countries (Zeng, 2019; Zou, 2018). By 2019, it was linked to 136 countries and 30 international organisations through memoranda of cooperation and joint statements (Liu, et al., 2020, pp. 137–145). The majority of the BRI projects are bilateral ones, between China and the partner country, with more than 75% of finance in average being provided by Chinese institutions as loans (Hurley, et al., 2018). Total amount loaned until 2019 (Pre-Covid period) is 292 billion USD according to the World Bank, while other studies estimate it up to 350 billion USD, of which 66 % were made to sovereign institutions or enterprises (Liu, et al., 2020). At first glance, these loans do not have particularly advantageous terms compared to international rates (Dunford, 2020; Liu, et al., 2020). Still for most BRI countries, these conditions are apparently more favourable than they could find in international finance markets, due to their political and economic instabilities. The BRI thus gives an “exit” to weaker non-democratic regimes face to the unipolar order at the price of making them dependent to Beijing, which has no normative objection to their regimes, in fact on the contrary, since it has been representing an “antithetic” normative cannon more and more vocally (Vangeli, 2018). As such, the BRI gains its systemic meaning within the China-unipolar order relation (Benabdallah, 2019).

The perception of the Chinese foreign policy’s increasing assertiveness finds its systemic explanation within the dynamics of its modus vivendi’s erosion and of the consequent emergence of an antithetic politico-economic and ultimately normative
position. Since China's non-commitment and non-escalation policies were integral parts of its eroding – and being replaced- *modus vivendi* with the unipolar order, it is hardly surprising that China's relations with the Pacific countries that are in a continuity, adherence or first type of coexistence type relation with the unipolar order have become tenser, as in the examples of Taiwan (Xiying, 2021, pp. 547–576; Scobell, 2018, pp. 199–224), Senkaku Islands (Fravel, 2016, pp. 1–21) or Spratly Islands (The South China Sea Arbitration, 2016) issues. China has increasingly been involved in the India-Pakistan dialectic through the BRI, since transport lines toward the BRI port of Gwadar had to pass through Kashmir (Rimmer, 2018, pp. 3–26). Chinese military cooperation with Pakistan was intensified both in terms of arms supplies and joint production of sophisticated weaponry and Beijing significantly augmented its naval presence in the Indian Ocean (Brewster, 2018, pp. 55–79; Jabin, 2018, pp. 105–136). China's military programme of 2015 aims at becoming the biggest power in Asia by 2035 and at equalling the US in 2050 (as the “highest global standard”) (Anthony, 2018, pp. 208–219; Kokoshin, 2016). Consequently, US', Taiwan's, Japan's, India's, Philippines', South Korea's and even Australia's irritation has steadily been increasing.

**Antithetic alignment: From rapprochement to entente cordiale**

Russian and Chinese *modus vivendi*’s erosion and their shift toward systemic challenge are fundamentally different from the unipolar order’s earlier confrontations: In both cases, the challenge appears “symmetrical” and competitive, not only in the sense of power-distribution but also and more comprehensively, of *Weltanschauung*. Not a “rogue state” opposes the unipolar order but two major powers with capabilities to balance, at least to a degree, the unipole and its alignment network and to present a system-level normative antithesis that is susceptible to attract actors actually or potentially incompatible with the order. On the other hand, the reactionary nature of their *Weltanschauung* is of note: It exists as antithesis to something pre-existent, the unipolar order. In being antithetic, Chinese and Russian positions are dependent on the unipolar order, whereas the order is self-standing relative to them, as it does not need Sino-Russian antitheses to exist. As such, the dialectic appears to be initially – and paradoxically – one sided, in particular as regards alignment dynamics: China and Russia gain a solid common denominator of systemic character, whereas the components of the order had no such motivation.

The said dialectic that engendered alignment became predominant only with the gradual fading away of each actor’s *modus vivendi*. The process may be described as having two stages, that of *rapprochement* for a period when the “erosion” had not yet reached critical level, therefore rather reinforcing the self-preservation facet of
each actor’s *modus vivendi*, and that of *entente cordiale* when their relation with the order became definable as systemic challenge.

The *rapprochement* stage was initiated on the basis of common concerns related to Central Asia. Eagerness to decrease Russian political influence either by opting for neutrality like Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan or the Western-encouraged tendencies of the regional actors to formulate alternative routes of exporting the energy resources as in the example of Nabucco project (Baev and Overland, 2010, pp. 1075–1090) created “near-abroad concerns” in Moscow. Fundamentalist movements exemplified by the Tajik civil war, their spill over to Uzbekistan and even Kyrgyzstan posed further threats for Russia and China, which were facing separatisms with fundamentalist penchant in their own territories, initially appearing sympathetic to unipolar order in their “separatist” identities. This led to a security dialogue, gradual resolution of the border issues (Korolev, 2020, pp. 760–789) and ultimately to the SCO, still within the *modus vivendi*’s non-confrontational, therefore alignment-preventing environment for both actors. The initial phase of the rapprochement mainly consisted of:

– The Shanghai Declaration of 1996 which brought a set of military confidence building measures between Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (Melville and Shakleina, eds., 2005).

– The 1997 “Russian-Chinese Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Order” (Russian-Chinese Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Order, 1997; Lukin, 2018, pp. 100–101), stressing the bipolarity-inherited notions of sovereignty and non-interference for a post-bipolar “new order” without explicit criticism of unipolarity. This was followed by 1998’s Joint Communiqué stressing that “the emerging Russian-Chinese strategic partnership was not an alliance and was not aimed against third countries” (Lukin, 2018, p. 100).

– The 2000 Dushanbe Declaration of the Shanghai Five, expressing support for Russia on Chechnya and for China’s “one China” principle (Melville and Shakleina, eds., 2005). One year later, the SCO was created on the basis of regional security cooperation (Cheng, 2018, pp. 397–398).

The rapprochement gained pace following the Kosovo intervention and Putin’s coming to power. Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept of 2000 stressed “…the concurrence of the fundamental approaches of Russia and China to the key issues of world politics” and stipulated that it was necessary to bring “the range of economic interaction into line with the level of political relations” (Melville and Shakleina, eds., 2005). In 2001, the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation between Russia and China was signed (Treaty of Good-Neighborliness, 2001) and constituted the framework of further rapprochement. The document foresaw:
– Respect of state sovereignty, territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference, peaceful co-existence.
– Respect of each other’s choice for the course of political, economic, social and cultural development in line with their nation’s actual conditions.
– China’s support of Russian policies to defend its national unity and territorial integrity. Russia’s support of One China Principle.
– No alliance or becoming part of a bloc, no treaty with a third country that compromises the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of the other contracting party.
– Strategic cooperative partnership.
– Opposing any use of force to bring pressure or interfering in the internal affairs of a sovereign state under all sorts of pretexts.
– Cooperation in the United Nations and its Security Council. Reinforcement of the central role of the United Nations as the most authoritative and the most universal world organisation composed of sovereign states in handling international affairs.
– Cooperation in such areas as economy and trade, military know-how, science and technology, energy resources, transport, nuclear energy, finance, aerospace and aviation, information technology and other areas of common interest.

The Treaty did not only foresee closer economic and political ties but also defined a common world-view that differed from the unipolar order, stressing sovereignty and non-interference over unipolarity’s “norms”. Still, the discourse has been non-confrontational.

Following the Treaty, China and Russia achieved the demarcation of their borders in 2004 (the final agreement took place in 2008). They conducted their first joint military exercise in 2005 (Østevik and Kuhrt, 2018, pp. 79–80). In the international fora, they visibly coordinated their positions regarding the 2003 Iraq War and the Northern Korea issue (Lukin, 2018, pp. 106–108; Turner, 2009, pp. 159–184). They worked together in founding and reframing BRICS as a “non-unipolarist” group and for a time gained considerable success at that as the BRICS’ attitude differed significantly for example between the “unipolar” Libya intervention and “anti-unipolar” intervention to Ukraine (Brosig, 2019, pp. 81–86, 149–151).

The development of the Sino-Russian bilateral trade has been impressive during the period that followed the Treaty (Belopolsky, 2009, pp. 65–85). Until the mid-90’s, average annual trade volume had remained around 5,5–6 billions USD and grew rather slowly for the remainder of the decade. However, between 2000 and 2008 Georgian crisis, average annual trade increase rate reached 30 %. In 2011, the
volume was 55.8 billion and in 2012 79.25 billion USD (Lukin, 2018, pp. 140–145). Trade volume continued to expand until 2014 (89 billion USD) (Russian trade with China in 2014, 2016).

The Ukrainian crisis and the launch of the BRI in 2014 apparently constituted landmark events in Sino-Russian relations as they signified the critical points in their *modus vivendi*’s erosion. Rapprochement began to be replaced by an *entente cordiale* on the common normative denominator of “anti-unipolarism”, the antithetic character of which was more and more expressed as the *modus vivendi*’s braking effect diminished. Moreover, it is of note that the “antithetic” rather than self-standingly “thetic” character of the emerging *entente* has shown itself on a number of occasions in Sino-Russian convergence in international fora, UN Security Council in particular, as this convergence displayed normative double standards in favour of anti-unipolarism over expressed “norms” of the *entente* (Cunliffe, 2019, pp. 245–250; Danner, 2018, pp. 53–65).

It is also of note that a newer phenomenon appeared in Sino-Russian relations as the cautious rapprochement evolved toward *entente*, which is the politico-economic asymmetry. While China was making a “progressive” and ambitious post-*modus vivendi* move aiming at widening its economic/political network, Russia confronted the unipolar order more directly, involving sanctions, which narrowed its economic/political *marge de manoeuvre*. The differing passages to the *entente* added political asymmetry to the already existing economic asymmetry (2014 and 2015 GDPs in current USD, 2022; GDP (current US$) – Russian Federation. World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files, 2022). During the post-2014 period, Russia has not only continued to be susceptible to face sharper political confrontation with the unipolar order due to further escalations in Ukraine, Syria and even Libya, but also its economic imbalance with China steadily grew: As of 2020, Russia’s GDP was 1,483 trillion in current USD (GDP (current US$) – Russian Federation. World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files, 2022) and China’s 14,723 (GDP (current US$) – China. World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files, 2022). While more than 15% of the Russian foreign trade is made with China (Russian trade with China in 2018, 2019), the Russian share in Chinese foreign trade is 2% (Exports of goods and services (current US$), 2022; Imports of goods and services (current US$) – China. World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files, 2022). This asymmetry required careful *political regulation* to sustain a workable, egalitarian relation, which would not evolve toward Russia’s “vassalisation” by China as a non-alternative to its submission to the unipolar order or toward a sort of alignment that would be rather parasitic on China.
In May 2014, right after the Ukrainian crisis and the western sanctioning of Russia, Gazprom signed a 30-year deal of natural gas export agreement with PetroChina, worth 400 billion USD, unhindered by the Ukrainian crisis and western sanctions. The agreement required the construction of a grand pipeline (Power of Siberia), among other previously devised (yet roughly coinciding with the Georgian Crisis) projects on oil transport (Overland and Kubayeva, 2018, p.100, pp. 104–111). The Vladivostok free-port and special economic zones projects were introduced in 2014 and 2015 with Chinese capital involved (Blakksrud, 2018, pp. 11–30).

In May 2015, during Xi’s visit of to Russia, a joint statement was made on “cooperation in coordinating the development of the EAEU and the Silk Road Economic Belt” (Lukin, 2018, p. 58). On the other hand, the Chinese desire to include economic cooperation in the SCO framework did not progress and Beijing did apparently not insist on the matter, giving an example to political management of the asymmetry. Here however, the BRI (The Belt) becomes susceptible to constitute the circumventing mechanism: Fels draws attention to changing attitudes regarding the alignment of the SCO with the Belt (Fels, 2018, pp. 247–267) and through the Belt, alignment may potentially extend toward the EAEU as well.

One of the BRI’s “Belt” part’s two itineraries toward Europe passes through Russia and the other through Central Asia (China–Kazakhstan railway to Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Iran corridor), as such constituting a politico-economic safeguard for Beijing besides its purely economic rationale (Schortgen, 2018, pp. 25–28), while integrating Russia to the network at the same time. It is also of note that it is difficult to say that the Russian integration mechanism – the EAEU – has been a success so far or matches/ may match the BRI for the region’s countries in increasing trade or investments (Vinokurov, 2018). Even before the BRI gained pace, Chinese trade volume with the five Central Asian ex-USSR countries had reached 34 billion USD in 2015, while Russia’s trade volume with them registered 23 billion USD. Lastly, China is already the most important creditor for these countries (Indeo, 2018, pp. 135–153). With the Belt projects gradually taking effect, the relevance of the EAEU will be more and more dependent on the Chinese political accommodation of Russia (Qoraboyev and Moldashev, 2018, pp. 115–130).

As to the post-2014 evolution of the bilateral trade, the volume shrank by 28 % in 2015 to 63.5 billion USD due to western sanctions’ general impact on the Russian economy (Russian trade with China in 2015, 2016), slightly increased to 66 billion USD in 2016 (Russian trade with China in 2016, 2017) and leapt forward in 2017 (87 billion dollars). It reached 108 billion USD in 2018, when the two countries declared their aim for 2024 as 200 billion USD (Russia & China set to double trade
turnover to $200 billion in 5 years, 2019). However, the volume increased only 2.43% in 2019 (approximately 110 billion USD) (Russian trade with Cuba in 2018, 2019) and decreased by 6.27% in 2020, the first year of COVID crisis, to 104 billion USD. Still, another leap forward is being observed in 2021, with an increase of 29.5% in the first eight months (China-Russia trade volume expected to hit a new high in 2021, 2021). What distinguishes this commerce from the two countries’ trade with their main commercial partners (the EU for Russia and the US for China) seems to be its – again and almost – politically regulated nature in preserving equilibrium particularly during rapid growth. In contrast to Russia-EU and China-US trade which continuously produced big surpluses for Moscow and Beijing, a general balance seems to have been ensured quite artificially (Russian trade with China in 2015, 2016; Russian trade with China in 2016, 2017; Russian trade with China in 2017, 2018; Russian trade with China in 2018, 2019) despite the extreme contrast between commodities: Russian exports to China have been dominated by the energy resources and other raw materials while Chinese exports have concentrated on machinery and consumer goods (Lukin, 2018, p. 139, 141, pp. 144–145). Imbalances occurred mostly due to fluctuations of hydrocarbon prices –most of Russian exports- and they were “ironed out” the following year as in the example of 2017–2018 figures (2017’s Russian trade deficit of 9 billion USD became 3.8 billion USD Russian trade surplus in 2018 (Russian trade with China in 2018, 2019; Russian trade with China in 2017, 2018; Lukin, 2018, p. 140).

In contrast to bilateral trade, the FDI flow from China to Russia has been meagre (Lukin, 2018, pp. 145–148). There had been an increase in 2014 (from 8.6 to 14.2 billion USD) yet it followed a slightly descending course as it was calculated at 12.8 billion USD in 2020 (2021). Despite the general decline of the Chinese outward investments since 2016, compared to the annual outward flow of 156 billion USD (2020), this amount is feeble (2022). On the other hand, Chinese non-bank entities’ loans show a steady and steep increase after 2014, the year of the Ukrainian crisis and western sanctions (a comparable “jump point” had been the 2008 crisis) (Overland and Kubayeva, 2018, p. 100), partially compensating this lacuna.

Regarding collective security, Moscow-centred CSTO’s continuing relevancy is crucial for Russian preponderance in its Central Asian near-abroad. This therefore constitutes another matter of political regulation, since the SCO’s evolution toward this field may potentially be attractive to the Central Asian republics for balancing Russia with China. Chinese position has generally been accommodating to Russian position so far. The SCO Development Strategy until 2025 (2015) indicated that the SCO itself is not a political-military alliance (Development Strategy of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization until 2025, 2015). Also, the SCO’s enlargement toward
India and Pakistan in 2017, two antagonistic powers, may prevent the SCO to extend into the sphere of collective security which could rival the CSTO.

The defence cooperation mostly takes the form of Russian arms exports to China, including sophisticated arms or parts and *de jure* or *de facto* technology transfer. However it does not seem to occupy a significant part in the overall bilateral trade (Russian foreign trade statistics. Source: Federal Customs Service of Russia, 2018), due to its unique nature and to China’s ambitious military programme, it constitutes an important component of the *entente*, while alleviating the asymmetry at the same time (Lukin, 2018, p. 157; Korolev, 2020).

Also, joint military/ naval exercises continue and their scale steadily increases, as to forces and geographies involved (Lukin, 2018, pp. 157–158; Korolev, 2020; Korolev, 2019, pp. 233–252). In particular, joint naval exercises in the Pacific as well as in European waters have been getting more frequent (Paul, 2019). These exercises bear political significance, given the naval nature of the confrontation potential in the Pacific as well as their taking place in the unipolar order’s contact zones with Russia, namely the Mediterranean (Marcus, 2015), the Baltic (Higgins, 2017) and the Black seas (Russian, Chinese combat ships pass through Black Sea straits for Mediterranean drills, 2015).

A “roadmap” was signed in 2017 for a period of 3 years, intensifying military cooperation face to “common threats”, as a “strategic choice” of the two countries (Wu, 2017). In November 2021, the roadmap was renewed and extended to 2025, involving “strategic military exercises and joint patrols by Russia and China” in particular face to common concern of the US’ “increasing strategic bomber flights” (Isachenkov, 2021).

The *entente* has been facing its most serious test nowadays, as Russia invaded Ukraine. The test was not produced by the invasion itself, since China could easily employ a rather anti-western discourse also in the matter of sanctioning Russia and adopt a neutral posture beneficial to Moscow as it did in 2014. It is put forward by the Russian military’s apparent failure to reach its initial aims and its being pushed back from the main axis of invasion, Kyiv, while having been stopped in the other theatres of war, roughly Kharkov and environs, Nikolayev-Odessa region and even Donbas for the time being. Helping the Russian *regime* to recover from the current debacle amplified by the now-effective sanctions becomes important for the *entente* and ultimately for Beijing’s position in its antithetic relation with the order. However, in the case of a Ukrainian-consented peace, which seems to be still on the table (despite the atrocities revealed in Bucha) and which would impose neutrality and possibly plebiscites in the contested regions upon Kyiv, China also may be freed of the
arguably economic and certainly political burden of bailing out Russia, as sanctions against Russia would have to be lifted gradually. Such a development, which seems to be within reach, would “save” and eventually reinforce the entente’s normative position in its challenge against the order and resume its development with less hindrance.

The Unipolar Order’s reaction to the challenge

The unipolar order’s relative inertia and reluctance face to the challenge may be explained by its self-standingly “thetic” nature, which did not require a systemic antithesis to exist. Its attitude change appears therefore “after”, more vague and slower than its antithesis’ moves, yet it exists. Symmetrical threat and systemic challenge diagnoses of the NATO Summits from 2014 to 2021 and their ensuing stress on the antithetic Weltanschauung of Russia and China constitute examples to this, as mentioned in the introduction. They give a basis for more concrete acts: NATO took initiatives in the field of the force readiness and deployment such as the Readiness Action Plan of the Wales Summit, enhanced security measures on the Eastern Flank and the “reliance to US forces” of the Warsaw Summit and the conventional deterrence commitment “30/30/30 over 30” of the Brussels Summit (Heisbourg, 2020; Ringsmose and Rynning, 2017). Some additional measures were taken in the field of nuclear deterrence as well (Larsen, 2019, pp. 174–193). After-2014 sanctions against Russia, despite their relative inefficiency, were held in place. Pre-war tensions between Russia and Ukraine increased the political mobilisation among the “Western” countries, however Ukraine did not receive MAP, guarantees or tangible military aid at that time that would serve to deter Moscow. At least, Moscow did not obtain a Munich 1938 from the unipolar order during the Russia-West talks of December 2021-early January 2022 (Goncharenko and Savitsky, 2022; Pifer, 2022).

Also, efforts for creating an alternative to the BRI have been increasing in the Indo-Pacific – if not in the “Belt” area: Japan and India has been joining efforts by establishing “connectivity corridors” to finance and build infrastructure in the region (Iwanek, 2021; Khurana, 2019, pp.27–33; Panda, 2019). In 2018, Japan attempted to fill the gap created by the controversial withdrawal of the Trump administration from the Trans-Pacific Partnership by pioneering the conclusion of the “Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership” which gathered 11 countries on the two sides of the Pacific (Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), 2018; Bride, et al., 2021). Still, the absence of the US makes this grouping “ideologically unclear” and China has applied for membership to the CPTPP in September 2021 (Hopewell, 2021), an attempt with a potential to unideologise and therefore neutralise this still-nascent alternative.
As to joint security, Japan, Australia, India, and the US launched the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue in November 2017 to expand cooperation between democracies in security and economic matters in the region. However the efficiency and commitment of this mechanism is still obscure, the Weltanschauung it expresses is not: The first leaders’ joint statement of the Quad, dated 12 March 2021, defined its aim as “A region that is free, open, inclusive, healthy, anchored by democratic values, and unconstrained by coercion” (Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement: “The Spirit of the Quad”, 2021).

The Australian, British and US leaders’ statement of 15 September 2021 declared the trilateral security partnership “AUKUS” (Joint Leaders Statement on AUKUS, 2021) and defined it as the three powers’ “recommitting themselves to the vision of protecting their shared values” in order to promote security and prosperity “for which they worked together for more than 70 years”. The statement also defined its first concrete step toward this aim as “to support Australia in acquiring nuclear-powered submarines”.

The US President underlined, in October 2021, that the US would defend Taiwan in the case of a Chinese attack, however the US policy on the matter has been defined as “strategic ambiguity”, the continuity of which was quickly reiterated by the White House (Biden says US will defend Taiwan if China attacks. 2021). Still, the escalation continues between Beijing and Washington on the matter, as the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs warned, late December 2021, that the US would “face unbearable price” in the case of interference (China warns US will ‘face unbearable price’ on Taiwan, 2021). Reuters announced on 20 January 2022 that the US was “seeking ways to speed delivery of new fighter jets (upgraded F-16s) to Taiwan” (Stewart, et al., 2022).

The custodians of the unipolar order have been facing, however, their most acute challenge so far as Russia invaded Ukraine. During the first months of the war, they have shown exceptional unity and determination in supplying Ukraine with lighter yet effective weapons, imposing now-crippling sanctions upon Russia and politically isolating the Moscow regime. While they have played a very important role in enabling Kyiv to fight back and stall the Russian advance, they apparently have been facing, the systemic bill of a possible peace settlement in Ukraine. Having avoided Ukrainian membership to NATO since 2008 and having been thus unable to deter the Russian invasion and to intervene in the conflict more directly or effectively, they set Kyiv free for its own peace with Russia which is equivalent, in systemic terms, to a “separate” peace of the World Wars –which were particular forms of systemic struggle on their own merit. Sanctions, which are the order’s main tools of
struggling with the Russian challenge and which gained efficiency only recently, have been existentially bound to Ukraine since 2014. As the Ukrainian neutrality – with perhaps 30s style guarantees- and even plebiscites in annexed or seceded territories are on the table and may constitute the contents of a Russo-Ukrainian peace, the systemic loser of the successful self-defense of the country is susceptible to be the custodians of the order and not Russia, even in comparison to now-unlikely scenario of a total Russian military victory over Ukraine which would leave the sanctions’ basis intact. This irony appears as the product of the years-long inertia and reluctance of the order in answering the growing systemic challenge.

Conclusions

There is no cultural or historical affinity between China and Russia to produce a natural alignment. Their common security concerns as regards separatist and fundamentalist movements are more of a matter of ad hoc coordination as it was during the 90s, rather than a basis for alignment. Trade, finance and investments are certainly of common interest, yet they alone do not constitute a reason for alignment but a consequence of it, as shown by their need to be politically balanced. Military cooperation, in particular the Russian arms supply and technology transfers to China bear importance, yet this importance stems from the increasingly confrontational relations with the unipolar order, therefore it constitutes, here again, a consequence rather than a cause of alignment. Alignment precedes the contents of cooperation.

The rapprochement and the entente between Moscow and Beijing appear as direct products of their relations with the unipolar order, the former reflecting the modus vivendi and the latter the post-modus vivendi periods. In different manners and for different reasons, their modus vivendi were eroded, gradually shifting their relations with the unipolar order from coexistence to confrontation. The emerging confrontation does not reflect a purely objective power-relation within the international structure. It is not something akin to the rivalry between the UK and Germany before the I World War. It is even not like bipolarity that was as much a product of two actors’ post-war power-relations as it was a “normative” confrontation, since the latter was not that intense during much of the multipolar inter-war period. The current dialectic is fundamentally between the Weltanschauungen which define the power-relations as the shielding effect of the modus vivendi has faded away. It is between the unipolar normative canon and its alternative, between democratic norms – not without lacunas, contradictions and even hypocrisy – and antithetic regimes which either had to oppose or gained the capability of opposing the unipolar order. This fundamental character, which even contrasts to bipolarity, stems from the very nature of unipolarity, as it brought a normative preponderance that was not complete, that engendered but a modus vivendi and not a normative hegemony. It is therefore of systemic nature, in a sense
that surpasses the structural realist understanding of objectivity, yet expressible in structural realist terms as it engenders the objectivity as its meaning ground.

The Sino-Russian entente is both an axis of convenience in Lo’s (2008) and a durable cooperation in Lukin’s terms within the framework of unipolarity. An axis of convenience, since it was neither Russia’s nor China’s first choice, but the result of their modus vivendi’s “failure” in gaining permanence. Once it appeared, its antithetic nature, its being dialectically attached to the unipolar order, made the entente as durable as its antithesis: The very presence of the unipolar order makes the entente of the antithetic powers valid and a systemic magnet to other regimes of similar or tending-to-be of similar nature, offering them a possibility of security alignment – exemplified by the Syrian War – and an economic alternative – the BRI –, which in turn may serve widening the entente’s systemic challenge. It is being countered slowly and perhaps clumsily by the unipolar order’s main actors largely due to the self-standing nature of their “thesis” in contrast to the “dependent” therefore inherently dynamic antithesis of the entente. The adequacy of the unipolar order’s emerging response to the systemic challenge would require coherence and determination of its adherents, which is still unclear, despite the current developments related to the major event of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

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«ENTENTE CORDIALE» ПРОТИЛЕЖНИХ ДЕРЖАВ:
БОРОТБА КИТАЮ ТА РОСІЇ З ОДНОПОЛЯРНИМ ПОРЯДКОМ

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Поточні проблеми між Заходом/західніми союзниками та Росією і Китаєм мають системний характер не з огляду на структуру, а порядку, отже, не в сенсі спільності, змодельованої за владними відносинами між суб’єктами мікроекономіки, а в сенсі інтерсуб’єктивного, нормативного посилання, яке породжує значущі, живі відносини індивідуального актора та системи, які охоплюють відносини влади. Вони становлять зміст фундаментальної діалектики між двома світоглядами, тим, що визначило постбіполярний/однополярний міжнародний порядок, і тим, який ці дві великі держави довго зберігали через свій індивідуальний modus vivendi з ним. Їхній modus vivendi значною мірою зник із причин, характерних для кожного з них. «Антитетичний» характер їх виклику полягав у тому, щоб гнучко, але міцно вирівняти дві сили, тоді як самостійна «тетична» природа однополярного порядку поки що сповільнила його реакцію. Сердечна згода виявилася довговічною також під час останнього епізоду протистояння між Росією та міжнародним порядком, вторгнення в Україну.

Сама наявність однополярного порядку робить союз протилежних держав дійсним і системним магнітом для інших режимів аналогічного характеру або такого, що тяжіє до подібного, надаючи їм можливість узгодження у сфері безпеки. Проте, між Китаєм і Росією немає культурної чи історичної подібності, яка могла б призвести до природного вирівнювання. Їхні загальні побоювання стосовно безпеки по відношенню до сепаратистських та фундаменталістських рухів є скоріше питанням спільної координації, яка була у 90-х роках, а не основою для погодження. Торгівля, фінанси та інвестиції, безумовно, становлять спільний інтерес, проте самі по собі вони не є підставою для узгодження, а є його наслідком, про що свідчить їхня необхідність бути політично збалансованими. Військова співпраця, зокрема постачання російської зброї та технологій Китаю, мають важливе значення, проте це потреба зумовлена дедалі більш конфронтаційними відносинами з однополярним світом і знову є наслідком, а не причиною об’єднання.
Ключові слова: Росія; Китай; однополярність; демократія; авторитаризм.

Endnotes:

i Such as the much generalised «civilised world» of the XIXth Century’s multipolarity, strict “balance of power” of post-Bismarck multipolarity or Wilsonian-minus-Wilson principles of early post-War multipolarity.

ii Ironically, Ukrainian Crisis erupted on the matter of signature of the Association Agreement with the EU.

iii Foreign Policy Concept, National Security Concept and Military Doctrine

iv The analogy with French-British entente cordiale is to stress the absence of a formal and binding alliance but a «common understanding» for acting in the same direction and toward the same “threat”, here being of systemic character.

v As an example, Russia’s 1993 Foreign Policy Concept’s remark is of note: “...Relations with China must be built in such a way that no third countries might be tempted to use China to Russia’s detriment, and nor must China play “the Russian card” in its relations with other countries”.

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