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**“WE WANT TO KEEP THIS OCCUPIED AREA
IN OUR HANDS FOR A LONG TIME”.
HUNGARIAN–GERMAN DEBATES ON PRYKARPATTIA,
1941–1942¹**

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When Hungary entered into the war against the Soviet Union on 27 June 1941, an objective for Hungary was not the acquisition of some regions of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, during 1941 and 1942, the Hungarian leadership took several steps to bring the Northeastern Carpathian Foothills (Prykarpattia) permanently under its control and assert its political objectives there. This paper has two main objectives: the reconstruction of the Hungarian plans and intention on the Prykarpattia and the examination of the German reaction to the Hungarian steps. To this end, the author has critically examined the sources on the subject, especially the documents of the Hungarian National Archives, (Hungarian) Military History Archives, Department Military Archives of Federal Archives and Political Archive of the Federal Foreign Office.

In his study, the author explores the Hungarian plans for Prykarpattia and their background. These plans were rooted in the promises were made unofficially by the Germans and the policy-making role of the Hungarian military leadership. It is important to note that, although the German-friendly Hungarian military high command sought to do so, these proposals did not come together into a single political plan. The Hungarian military leadership tried to implement three of its ambitious plans: 1) economic exploitation of the occupied border areas; 2) expulsion of “stateless” Jews from Hungary to areas east of Galicia; 3) changing the Northeastern border of Hungary.

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Overall, Hungarian efforts in the Eastern Galician territories may be considered unsuccessful. Contrary to unofficial promises, the Germans wanted to prevent all Hungarian claims to Prykarpattia. The number of conflicts was further increased that Hungarians often tried to transfer their intentions to south-eastern Galicia without consultation with the Germans.

Key words: Second World War; Ukrainian history; Hungarian history; Holocaust; German history; border.

Introduction

Hungarian foreign policy in the interwar period centred partly on the regaining of Hungarian territories lost under the 1920 Trianon Peace Treaty. Between 1938 and 1941, with the help of Germany and Italy, Hungary increased its territory by nearly 80,000 square kilometres at the expense of the disintegrating Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the Kingdom of Romania (Sipos, 1997, p. 507). Hungary's entry into the war against the Soviet Union on 27 June 1941 was also determined by preserving these territorial gains previously acquired within the German alliance. Thus, unlike Finland (Vehviläinen, 2002, pp. 104–108) and Romania (Solonari, 2019), the acquisition of some regions of the Soviet Union was not a primary objective for Hungary. Nevertheless, during 1941 and 1942, the Hungarian leadership took several steps to bring the North-eastern Carpathian Foothills (henceforth referred to as Prykarpattia) permanently under its control and assert its own political objectives there. This has provoked the opposition of the Germans both militarily and diplomatically.

Analysis of the previous publications and researches

In the subfields of the study, I could also base on previous literature results. Lóránd Dombrády gave the most comprehensive picture of the Hungarian military leadership during the Second World War (Dombrády, 2005). Krisztián Ungváry drew attention to the deportation plans of the Hungarian elite and the public formulated in the 1930s and 1940s (Ungváry, 2002; Ungváry, 2006). Only a few studies on the expulsion of stateless Jews in 1941 were published until the 1990s (Braham, 1973; Geyer, 1960; Majsai, 1986; Szirtes, 1996) but significant research results on this topic have been published in the last 15 years – especially by George Eisen, Tamás Stark, Kinga Frojimovics, Ádám and János Gellért (Eisen and Stark, 2013; Frojimovics, 2007; Gellért and Gellért, 2012; Gellért and Gellért, 2013; Gellért and Gellért, 2015). Ekkehard Völkl, Krisztián Ungváry, Zoltán Maruzsa and Oleksandr Pahiria addressed the issue of Galician border change earlier (Maruzsa, 2010; Pahiria, 2014, pp. 58–64; Ungváry, 2005, pp. 120–122; Ungváry, 2015, pp. 185–189;

Vökl, 1992). Despite the existing publications, the Hungarian occupation of Prykarpattia and the economic debates of the Hungarian-German military leadership were under-researched among Hungarian historians.

Specifying the purpose of research

This paper has two main objectives: the reconstruction of the Hungarian plans and intention on the Prykarpattia and the examination of the German reaction to the Hungarian steps.

Presentation of the main research material

Initially, the annexation of the territories in Prykarpattia to Hungary was informally suggested by Germany to encourage Hungarian involvement in the war. In September 1939, Germans offered the Hungarians some territory from Soviet troops in eastern Galicia, which was rejected by the Hungarian leadership (Szent-Iványi Domokos, MNL OL K 63 473. cs. 75/a, p. 289; Juhász, 1962, p. 487, 505; Ormos, 2000, p. 645). Germany informally made similar pledges before Operation Barbarossa. According to the post-war records of István Ujszászy, head of Hungarian military intelligence, Staff Colonel Rudolf Toussaint promised on behalf of Hitler that Hungary could obtain the former “Principality of Halych.” The Germans came up first with the idea of border adjustment to protect the Carpathians (Haraszi, 2007, p. 325). According to the documents in the Nuremberg Trial, this issue showed up during the Hungarian–German military negotiations in January 1941, as well as in Ribbentrop’s letter sent to Bárdossy in May 1941 (Pahiria, 2014, p. 59).

However, this did not reflect the Germans’ actual position since their primary objective was to draw Hungary into the military campaign against the Soviet Union without specific German request or reward (Pritz, 2004, pp. 25–39). Hitler himself expressly rejected the idea of leaving the Eastern Galician territories to Hungary (Kun, 1962, p. 18).

Probably because of the German request mentioned above and its own political ambitions, the Hungarian military leadership set political goals for the occupied territories at the beginning of the war. On 20 June 1941, before the start of the war against the Soviet Union, the head of the Berlin military attaché, Colonel Sándor Homlok, supported the Hungarian involvement and the intervention of Hungarian troops in Prykarpattia as well. This was justified on the basis that “*by this, we can negotiate with them to meet our other needs. And if we fail to do so, we will be idle observers of how a common German–Romanian border will be created*” (Ádám, Juhász and Kerekes, 1959, p. 363). (Due to the possibility of Hungarian intervention outlined by Homlok, the Romanian ambassador to Berlin also

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approached Ribbentrop in July 1941) (Dziuban, 2001, p. 369). Some three weeks later, on 12 July, he sent a more comprehensive proposal to his supervisors:

“By keeping the territory under military occupation by the H[ungarian]. R[oyal]. Defence Forces until the Dniester River, the following advantages arise:

a. The final border adjustment of the Hungarian border, where necessary for protection, can be implemented.

b. It constitutes a primary ventilation valve. Through this, all those infiltrated from that direction can be resettled from Hungary to the north of the Carpathians.

c. It is also suitable for the relocation of unreliable Slovaks and Romanians living in Hungary.

d. It is an object for barter” (Report of the Hungarian Military Attaché at Berlin, MNL OL K 63 1941-21/28. 1469/436.k.a.-1941.).

The grand plans of the military attaché can hardly be considered merely the private action of a diplomat in Berlin. He points out that Henrik Werth, General of the Infantry and Chief of Staff of the Defence Forces, summarised the possibilities of the war against the Soviet Union in a memorandum to Prime Minister László Bárdossy in August 1941:

“a. the restoration of our millennial borders,

b. the deportation of Slavic and Romanian nationalities living within the borders,

c. the deportation of the Jews,

d. acquiring a share of the Soviet resources” (Szinai and Szűcs, 1962, p. 306).

Three important common features can be highlighted in the three proposals mentioned here. On the one hand, the leadership of the Hungarian armed forces, especially Werth, has repeatedly intended not only to support but to shape the policies of the current Hungarian governments. In terms of foreign policy, this was manifested in promoting stronger relations with Germany and supporting the entry into the war (and then greater participation in the war). In the domestic scene, the leadership of the armed forces was calling for repressive actions against the non-Hungarian nationalities. These policy directions were present at the beginning of the war against the Soviet Union. On the other hand, these sources explicitly reflect on the radical political resettlement plans of the Nazis, and Generalplan Ost, in particular (Ungváry, 2002, pp. 95–103). Thirdly, although Werth’s last memorandum gave the Prime Minister sufficient reason to make the Chief of Staff of the Defence Forces replace by Governor Miklós Horthy in September on the grounds of unauthorized interference in the affairs of the government, as we can see, the government itself called for the deportation of the Jews.

Homlok's and especially Werth's ideas were conveyed for Hungarian troops on the eastern front by the Head of the General Staff Directorate Executive Staff, Lieutenant General Dezső László:

"We want to keep this [Eastern Galician] occupied area in our hands for a long time so that we can transport the captured raw materials, food, fuel, and especially rubber as quickly as possible and, on the other hand, to relocate the undesirable elements, Jews and Ukrainians of Hungary to this area" (The VIII Corps combat operations, HL, II. Kárpát-csoport I/1, p. 203).

The above observation summarised all the objectives that were to be achieved by the Hungarian administration in Prykarpattia. On the one hand, to transport booty, raw materials, and food from these territories. On the other hand, to carry out the deportation of Jews considered "undesirable" by the Hungarian state. The target for the deportation was Ukraine beyond the Dniester, and the territories of Ukraine occupied by Hungarian troops (Prykarpattia) would have been used to maintain the transport line leading there.

This was made possible by the presence of Hungarian troops in Eastern Galicia for about a month. Hungarian troops crossed the Soviet border on 30 June and occupied the south-eastern Galician territories in a few days. The Rapid Corps continued their advance under German leadership (Andaházi Szeghy, 2016, pp. 43–61). As of 9 July, the remaining two divisions of the Carpathian Group were occupying the Stanislau and Kolomea regions. On the one hand, the Hungarian military administration, which lasted until mid-August, directly bordered Hungary (Andaházi Szeghy, 2016, pp 127–133). On the other hand, contrary to the subsequent Hungarian occupations, at that time, the Hungarians were able to build their own military administration independently from Germany.

In addition to the intentions of the Hungarian military administration, the reason for the formation of the independent Hungarian military administration was the omission of the Hungarian troops from the preparation of Operation Barbarossa. Although informal negotiations between Germany and Hungary took place before the attack of the Soviet Union, the Germans wanted to keep the operations in secrecy and force the Hungarians to offer their support "independently" from German requests. This led to an uncoordinated process in which the authority of the different occupying forces was not apparent. This was further complicated because the relationship between the various German institutions (Wehrmacht, SS, SD, economic administration, civil administration) was not clarified, and many institutions acted on confidential orders (Dallin, 1981, pp. 20–43). These chaotic conditions are well

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illustrated by a report by the head of the quartermaster's department of the Carpathian Group, Staff Captain Endre Siegler, from December 1941:

“The area is full of Germans inclined to violence, with no subordination to anyone as they are running about and discommoding. They mainly had the open commands of OHL [sic – read: OKH (Oberkommando des Heeres, High Command of the German Army); OHL (Oberste Heeresleitung) is the name of the Supreme Army Command during the First World War]]. They did not even take orders from Heeresgruppe Süd [Army Group South]. Of course, everyone was looking at their own petty interests; each of them had to be individually agreed, but no generous or general agreement could be reached” (HL VKF 4107/el.1.-1942).

An example of the latter is the conflicts of the Headquarter of the Carpathian Group with the German security service in the summer of 1941. The Einsatzgruppen were not allowed to operate in the territory of the Hungarian occupation (Klein, 1997, p. 160), and the commander of the army corps, Lieutenant General Ferenc Szombathelyi, took personal action against the execution of Jews on at least one occasion (Eisen and Stark, 2013, pp. 226–227; Ungváry, 2015, pp. 179–180). In October 1941, following an order of the Army Group South (Arad, Gutman and Margalot, 1981, p. 388), the problem of authority was settled between the Hungarian occupiers and the German state security services. The order gave the Germans a free hand in the actions against the Jews and the “anti-empire elements” (Hungarian Occupation Group HQ order No. 2. 13 October 1941. HL, II. 1458).

In these circumstances, the role of Hungarian troops in economic and financial issues in the occupied territories and their contribution to deportation has drawn sharp criticism from the German military and political leadership.

Hungarian troops treated the machinery and raw materials in the operational areas as spoils of war and expected a share to contribute to the economic recovery of the areas. In contrast, from the outset, the Germans were thinking of exploiting the occupied territories independently and exclusively (Müller, 1991, pp. 180–181). Accordingly, they explicitly protested the systematic looting and appropriations executed by the Hungarian troops (Fernschreiben Nr 11. PA AA R 60751; Ungváry, 2005, pp. 183–185). On the one hand, these actions damaged the German economic interests and, on the other hand, alienated the occupiers from the local population.

The issue of the Galician oil fields was particularly sensitive. One of the most important economic measures of the Hungarian administration was the installation of oil wells. To this end, Hungary sent oil engineers to these areas (HL VKF 5751/el.1.-1941). At the end of July, the Minister of Defence, Károly Bartha, visited the commissioning work (The occupation duty of the Carpathian Group, HL, II. Kárpát-csoport IV/1, p. 9).

In any case, Germany wanted to prevent the Hungarians from acquiring these oil reserves. On the exact day when the first units of the Carpathian Group crossed the Soviet border, the headquarters of the Southern Army Group commanded the German 17th Army to occupy the Drohobych oil fields before the arrival of Hungarian troops (Anlage zu AOK 17 Ia Nr. 092/41, BA MA RH 22/5, p. 5). According to Paulus' testimony, this was requested by Hitler himself (Khristoforov, 2011, p. 724). However, this order was made public by the Soviet Union on 6 July, putting the German ambassador in Budapest in an awkward position (Ránki, Pamlényi, Tilkovszky and Juhász, 1968, pp. 602–603).

On 14 July, the Germans informed the Hungarians that they would also take over the oil wells on the territories occupied by Hungarians (Napi helyzetjelentés..., HL VKF NHJ, 14.07.1941). Although the Germans justified their position by emphasizing the higher level of expertise of the German technical units (Fernschreiben Nr 11, PA AA R 60751.), the Hungarians recognized the ulterior motives. For this reason, at the beginning of August, the Hungarian technical teams began dismantling the oil mining equipment, which provoked complaints from both the Wehrmacht and the General Government (Napi helyzetjelentés..., HL VKF NHJ, 05.08.1941, 09.08.1941). In addition, the Hungarian liaison officer in the German 17th Army was tasked with demanding one-tenth of the crude oil produced by Germans in South Galicia (HL VKF 5873/el.1.-1941). However, Germany undertook to supply fuel to the Hungarian troops involved in the 1941 operations only and, contrary to the original Hungarian plans, did not allow oil to be transported from the Galician oil fields to Hungary. Hungarians pushed the issue further in January 1942, when Keitel visited Hungary, but this attempt failed (HL VKF 4223/el.1.-1942).

Similarly, the Hungarian demands for the harvest were not fulfilled. In the area between the Hungarian border and Dniester, the Hungarians took responsibility for organizing the harvest (Harvest measure, HL, II. Kárpát-csoport 736. Kárp. csop. I.a.41.VII.26. sz.). When carrying out agricultural work, the Minister of Defence visiting Horodenka stated that “harvesting and transportation of crops are crucial issues for our national interest” (The occupation duty of the Carpathian Group, HL, II. Kárpát-csoport IV/1, p. 9). However, the Wehrmacht's economic institutions and the administration of the General Government did not allow the transportation of crops. The Hungarians tried to express their demands on a (military) diplomatic line, but even during the January 1942 negotiations, Germans made it clear that they were unwilling to hand over “the surplus of Galician products either in whole or in part” (MNL OL K 69 758. cs. I/2. 2.366.-szám/III.Csfség.-1942).

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Although the National Socialist leadership plans included the deportation of Jews living in the Empire and German-controlled territories to occupied Soviet territories (Browning, 2004, pp.294–352), the Hungarian and Romanian governments carried out these deportations without German pressure or even consultation with the Germans (Ancel, 2005, pp. 257–260).

The intention to the deportation of “Galician” or “foreign” Jews appeared in Hungarian political life even before the Second World War: in particular, in the debate on the so-called Second Jewish Law, the justification of which also raised the question of “alien residents.” Miklós Kozma, Governor-Commissioner of Carpathia, a key player in the events of 1941, thought about relocating Jews to the east in 1940 (Ormos, 2000, p. 738; Stark, 2013, pp. 1491–1494), and at the end of 1940, several Jewish people were expelled across the Hungarian–Soviet border (Frojimovics, 2007, pp. 94–99; Ormos, 2000, pp. 738–739). In mid-July 1941, at the initiative of the General Staff of the Defence Forces, the Council of Ministers ordered the deportation of Jews classified as “stateless” or “unsettled nationality” beyond the Dniester River, taking advantage of the Hungarian military administration set up in Prykarpattia (Gellért and Gellért, 2012; Eisen and Stark, 2013).

This is not the first time the Hungarian leadership’s deportation plans have caused problems in the German–Hungarian relationship. After the occupation of the “Southlands” (Délvidék, Vojvodina), the Hungarian military administration began deporting the so-called Dobrovolyacs, who moved there after 1918. These people were to be deported by the Hungarian authorities primarily to German-occupied Serbia. At the request of Hungary, the Germans first responded evasively. After the Hungarian authorities began to deport non-indigenous Serbs to the German occupation zone without consultation, the Germans protested on both military and diplomatic lines. By the end of May 1941, the deportations had been stopped (Sajti, 1984, pp.26–44). Despite all these precedents, the Hungarian leadership wished to carry out the deportations in a similar way in the Soviet territories, even though at the beginning of the operation, the Headquarters of the Carpathian Group warned the General Staff Directorate that “complications could arise” without consultation with the Germans (Napi helyzetjelentés, HL VKF NHJ, 15.07.1941).

First, at the end of July, the 444th Security Division and the 183rd Field Command indicated that the masses of deported Jews caused problems (such as food provision) in securing the occupied territories (Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung, 2002, p.129; Hoppe and Glass, 2011, p.221). Therefore, the Germans wanted the Hungarians to stop the deportation of the Jews and return them to Hungary. By mid-August 1941, they had successfully stopped the deportations,

partly due to the German warning on 10 August (Gellért and Gellért, 2013, p. 6). The other reason is connected to the change of the occupation zones. As the Carpathian Group was redeployed and territories were annexed to the General Government, the direct link between the Hungarian-occupied territories and Hungary ceased.

In addition, the Hungarian authorities did not want to transport the displaced Jews to Hungary and even asked the Germans to prevent their return. The Hungarian aliens policing authority specifically requested the German Foreign Office's support, but the Jewish desk (Judenreferat, Referat D III) of the Office also rejected this request (MNL OL K 83 9. cs. 149/pol.-1941). The German authorities complained that the Hungarians had illegally expelled persons to whom the Germans had provided documents for their return. Hungarians, however, have told the Germans that they are not taking adequate precautionary measures against the "infiltration" of displaced Jews. On 26 October 1941, the Hungarian and German authorities regulated the issue of deportation at the border between Hungary and the General Government in Stanisławów (Gellért and Gellért, 2013, p. 17). By then, however, many of the deported Hungarian Jews had been massacred as part of the destruction of the Jews of Ukraine. This happened in two main steps in Kamenets-Podolsk at the end of August 1941 (Gellért and Gellért, 2015) and in October in Stanisławów (Pohl, 1998).

At the turn of 1941 and 1942, Hungarian and German authorities remained in contact concerning the issue of the deported Jews in two ways. On the one hand, KEOKH (Central National Authority for Controlling Foreigners) deported stateless Jews even after the fall of 1941 (Frojimovics, 2007, pp. 134–146). On the other hand, Major General József Heszlényi led a private initiative and once again raised the issue of the deportation of 100,000 stateless Jews to the eastern territories. At that time, however, Germany has linked the deportation of these Jews to the deportation of the entire Jewish community in Hungary (Braham, 1963, p. 86–95; Braham, 1997, pp. 276–286; Ránki, Pamlényi, Tilkovszky and Juhász, 1968, p. 675).

By August 1941, Hungarian hopes for autonomous border management had been dashed; however, during the German–Hungarian negotiations of 7–10 September 1941, the Hungarian military leadership proposed the change of the north-eastern border (Hungary–General Government border at that time, Hungarian–Soviet border in 1939–1941, Hungarian–Polish border in 1939) (Szent-Iványi Domokos, *Csonkamagyarország külpolitikája...*, MNL OL K 63 473. cs. 75/a, p. 690). Between September 1941 and April 1942, several proposals were sent to the Germans. According to the proposal submitted by the Minister of Defence Forces to the Council of Ministers, Hungary requested the annexation of the

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predominantly uninhabited 10–15 kilometres wide border strip to Hungary for military reasons (to improve border protection) (HL HM 4296. cs. 20086/el.n.1.b-1942).

According to foreign ministry documents, the draft was submitted to the Germans by the governor and the military leadership without consultation with the government. Although at the September meeting, Döme Sztójay, the ambassador in Berlin, was tasked with the diplomatic representation of this issue, the Hungarian civic leadership tried to distance this claim from itself. Prime Minister László Bárdossy saw that such a move could discredit the consistency of Hungarian foreign policy, which only formulated territorial demands concerning the areas lost in 1920 (Szent-Iványi Domokos, *Csonkamagyarország külpolitikája...*, MNL OL K 63 473. cs. 75/a, 704–705).

The control of the Carpathians as means for protection against the Soviet Union has already appeared in the diplomatic papers in preparation for the Second Vienna Award (Juhász, 1982, pp. 144–145, 244–245, 265–268, 290, 311, 575, 671–673, 851–852). At the beginning of the war against the Soviet Union, the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs presumed that buffer states would be created in the occupied territories, as it was done during the First World War (Report of the Hungarian Military Attaché at Berlin, MNL OL K 63 200. cs. 1941-21/28. 1.454./427.k.a.-1941.; Juhász, 1982, 1236–1239). This required the strengthening of the Carpathian borders since a great Ukrainian state, which poses a threat to Transcarpathia, can be created northeast of Hungary (HL VKF 5121/el.n.1.-1942). Although the fears raised by the Hungarians may be considered unfounded in the light of the German plans for the eastern territories, similar considerations have been expressed by the Romanians due to the ambiguous communication of Germany (Ránki, 1983, p. 341). Besides, improving border surveillance served the purpose of preventing the return of deported Jews to Hungary (Gellért and Gellért, 2013).

Although the German documents show that Germans reacted indignantly and incomprehensibly to the Hungarian demand, they did not openly reject the claim. In particular, they complained that some Hungarian military troops had interfered in the affairs of the local administration, overstepping their authority. According to the mayor of Tatariv, Hungarian troops have begun the census of movable and real estate assets (*Gerücht über die Abtretung von Grenzgebieten...*, PA AA, R 105157. RSHA IV D 3 a 1299/42). According to the OUN [Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists] report, in Stanislau oblast, the Hungarian military authorities demanded, among other things, a pledge of allegiances from Ukrainian authorities (Artizov, 2012, p. 383). The Germans considered all these as preparations for a border change.

Due to the polycratic German structures, several offices reacted differently to Hungarian demands. The German Foreign Office has primarily sought to address the issue diplomatically rather than militarily. In this context, Szójay and Bárdossy had to respond diplomatically to the plans of the Hungarian General Staff, which the Germans believed were exaggerated. However, Hungary has always wanted to treat the issue of border adjustment as a military issue, thus freeing itself from the increasingly embarrassing situation (Szent-Iványi Domokos, *Csonkamagyarország külpolitikája...*, MNL OL K 63 473. cs. 75/a, pp. 704–707; Ránki, Pamlényi, Tilkovszky and Juhász, 1968, p. 619–621). During his visit to Bárdossy in December 1941, Hans Frank, head of the General Government, openly expressed his opposition to the border change, in contrast to the reticent behavior of the German Foreign Ministry. According to this, the question of border adjustment made a “generally bad impression in Berlin,” mainly because the General Government remained Hungary’s north-eastern neighbor, which is part of the German Empire (Szent-Iványi Domokos, *Csonkamagyarország külpolitikája...*, MNL OL K 63 473. cs. 75/a, p. 705; Ránki, Pamlényi, Tilkovszky and Juhász, 1968, p. 631, 633, pp. 635–637). RSHA [Reichssicherheitshauptamt, Reich Main Security Office] was involved in handling the case, which argued in detail against the annexation of the border strip based on the economic, historical, and racial characteristics of the population, in accordance with the national socialist ideology (Maruzsa, 2010; Ungváry, 2005, p. 120–122; Ungváry, 2015, pp. 185–189).

Representatives of Hungary and Germany finally met in June 1942 to negotiate the border change. While the Hungarian delegation led by retired Lieutenant General Medvey Aurél justified the border adjustment of some 3000 square kilometres for protection and border control against a future Ukrainian state, the much larger German negotiator put forward a series of economic and geographic arguments against the border change (HL VKF 5121/el.1.-1942). After realizing that the Germans would not give in and the Hungarian delegation did not enjoy the support of its own foreign ministry, the issue of border adjustment was postponed to the post-war settlement period based on a register of the German Foreign Office from 17 August 1942 (HL VKF 5311/el.1.-1942; 5441/el.1.-1942; Report of the Hungarian Embassy in Berlin, MNL OL K 63 203. cs. 21/1 158/pol-1942; Ránki, Pamlényi, Tilkovszky and Juhász, 1968, pp. 686–687).

Conclusions

Overall, Hungarian efforts in the Eastern Galician territories may be considered unsuccessful. During the subsequent phase of the war, the activities of the Hungarian occupying troops were entirely subordinated to the German headquarters,

and the civilian government remained in contact with the occupied territories only through foreign trade (Bálint, 2011, pp. 306–393; Fóris, 2019, pp. 128–139). It was not until November 1943 that Hungarian troops reappeared in this region, but the Hungarian military and political leadership did not set similar objectives concerning this area. However, the debates outlined above show that, in the first month of the war against the Soviet Union, neither the Hungarian military nor the political leadership had a clear vision of German policy in the eastern territories. On the other hand, the war against the Soviet Union radicalized the German and the Hungarian political and, more importantly, the military leadership. This process can be seen in the functioning of the Hungarian occupying troops and the radicalization of Jewish politics in Hungary.

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«ЦЮ ОКУПОВАНУ ТЕРИТОРІЮ ХОЧЕМО НАДОВГО УТРИМАТИ У СВОЇХ РУКАХ». УГОРСЬКО-НІМЕЦЬКІ ДЕБАТИ СТОСОВНО ТЕРИТОРІЙ ПРИКАРПАТТЯ, 1941–1942

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Коли 27 червня 1941 р. Угорщина вступила у війну проти Радянського Союзу, вона не ставила за мету придбання певних регіонів Союзу. Незважаючи на це у 1941 та 1942 рр. угорське керівництво здійснило декілька кроків, щоб взяти під тривалий контроль територію Північно-Східних Карпат (Прикарпаття) та забезпечити там виконання своїх політичних цілей. Стаття має два основні завдання: по-перше, реконструювати угорські плани та наміри, пов'язані з Прикарпаттям, та, по-друге, вивчити реакцію Німеччини на подібні угорські кроки. Із цією метою автор, дотримуючись джерелознавчої критики, опрацював архівні матеріали досліджуваної тематики, зокрема ті, що зберігаються в фондах Національного архіву Угорщини та угорського Військово-історичного архіву, а також Федерального військового архіву та Політичного архіву Федерального Міністерства закордонних справ, що у Німеччині.

У статті автор висвітлює угорські плани, що стосувалися Прикарпаття, а також їх передумови. Ці плани ґрунтувалися на неофіційно даних німцями обіцянках та на політизуючій ролі вищого угорського військового керівництва. Важливо відзначити: незважаючи на пронімецьку налаштованість останньої, обіцянки не об'єдналися в єдиному політичному плані.

Угорське військове керівництво намагалося реалізувати три амбітні плани: 1) економічну експлуатацію окупованих прикордонних районів; 2) вигнання євреїв «без громадянства» з Угорщини в райони на схід від Галичини; 3) змінити північно-східний кордон Угорщини. Загалом, зусилля угорських військ у Східній Галичині зазнали фіаско. Всупереч своїм неофіційним обіцянкам, німці намагалися запобігти всім претензіям угорської сторони стосовно Прикарпаття. Кількість конфліктів між ними тільки зростала, оскільки угорці часто намагались реалізувати свої наміри на південному сході Галичини без попередніх консультацій з німцями.

Ключові слова: Друга світова війна; історія України; історія Угорщини; Голокост; історія Німеччини; кордон.

**«ЭТУ ОККУПИРОВАННУЮ ТЕРРИТОРИЮ ХОТИМ НАДОЛГО
УДЕРЖАТЬ В СВОИХ РУКАХ». ВЕНГЕРСКО-НЕМЕЦКИЕ ДЕБАТЫ
ОТНОСИТЕЛЬНО ТЕРРИТОРИЙ ПРИКАРПАТЬЯ, 1941–1942**

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Когда 27 июня 1941 г. Венгрия вступила в войну против Советского Союза, она не ставила целью приобретения определенных регионов СРСР. Несмотря на это в 1941 и 1942 гг. венгерское руководство осуществило несколько шагов, чтобы взять под длительный контроль территорию Северо-Восточных Карпат (Прикарпатье), и обеспечить там выполнения своих политических целей. Статья имеет два основных задания: во-первых, реконструировать венгерские планы и намерения, связанные с Прикарпатьем, и, во-вторых, изучить реакцию Германии на подобные венгерские шаги. С этой целью автор, следуя источниковедческой критике, изучил архивные материалы по указанной тематике, в частности те, что хранятся в фондах Национального архива Венгрии и венгерского Военно-исторического архива, а также Федерального военного и Политического архивов Федерального Министерства иностранных дел, что в Германии.

В статье автор освещает венгерские планы, касающиеся Прикарпатья, а также их предпосылки. Эти планы основывались на неофициально данных немцами обещаниях и на политизирующей роли высшего венгерского военного руководства. Важно отметить следующее: несмотря на прогерманский настрой венгерского военного руководства, обещания не объединились в едином политическом плане.

Венгерское военное руководство пыталось реализовать три амбициозные планы: 1) экономическую эксплуатацию оккупированных приграничных районов; 2) изгнание евреев «без гражданства» из Венгрии в районы к востоку от Галичины; 3) изменить северо-восточную границу Венгрии. В целом же, усилия венгерских войск в Восточной Галиции не были успешными. Вопреки своим неофициальным обещаниям, немцы пытались предотвратить все претензии венгерской стороны относительно Прикарпатья.

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Количество конфликтов между ними только росло, поскольку венгры часто пытались реализовать свои намерения на юго-востоке Галичины без предварительных консультаций с немцами.

Ключевые слова: Вторая мировая война; история Украины; история Венгрии; Холокост; история Германии; граница.